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**Framing the Immigrant Movement as about Rights, Family, or Economics:**

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### **Which Appeals Resonate and for Whom?**

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#### **ABSTRACT:**

Although social movement scholars in the United States have long ignored activism over immigration, this movement raises important theoretical and empirical questions. Which movement frames resonate most with the “public”? Is the rights “master” frame persuasive in making the case for noncitizens? We leverage survey experiments—largely the domain of political scientists and public opinion researchers—to examine how much economic, human/citizenship rights, and family unity frames resonate with Californians. We pay particular attention to how potentially distinct “publics,” or sub-groups, might react to each frame. We find that alternative framings resonate with—at best—one particular political subgroup of the public and, dauntingly, frames that resonated with one group often alienated others. Thus, while activists and political theorists may hope that appeals to human rights can expand American notions of membership, such a frame does not help the immigrant rights movement. Instead, attitudes toward legalization change the most when the issue is framed as about family unity. But this only holds among self-reported conservatives. These findings underscore the challenges confronting the immigrant movement and the need for scholars to re-evaluate how historically progressive rights language does little for immigrant claims-making.

When making claims for immigrants, which frames are most resonant for ordinary Americans? Social movement scholars have long argued that activists can shape support for their goals through strategic framing. What many observers now call the immigrant rights movement uses a key “master” frame (Snow and Benford 1992; Benford 2013) in its very name: the language of rights. In doing so, immigrant activists appeal to and extend a rights framing that many U.S.-based social movements have used to identify problems, make demands or defend positions. This language is most evident in progressive movements for inclusion and equity, whether embedded in calls to eliminate “second-class” citizenship for racial minorities and women, or in calls for marriage equality by LGBT activists. But other U.S. social movements also engage the language of rights. For example, the National Rifle Association and those who defend gun ownership appeal to the Constitution and citizens’ right to bear arms. This language of rights,

we believe, presupposes important assumptions about membership that are tied to citizenship in the United States. Given that many who are the focus of immigrant rights activism do not have legal residency, much less citizenship, are rights claims a resonant frame for immigrant-focused social movements? If not, which other frames resonate with the American public?

Answering these questions requires researchers to combine insights from social movement, public opinion, and citizenship studies. Framing is a key concept in social movement research, but U.S. social movement scholars have long ignored activism around immigrant rights, in part because when major U.S. social movements agitated for change in the 1960s—around civil rights, women’s rights, or ending U.S. military engagement in Southeast Asia—immigration was at its lowest point in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>2</sup> Immigration also often falls into the realm of institutionalized politics, with major changes (or stasis) in immigration law understood as an outcome of elite political bargaining and targeted pressure by interest groups (Freeman 1995; Tichenor 2009; Zolberg 2006). If we follow Snow, Soule and Kriesi (2004: 6) in identifying a social movement as based on collective action, change-oriented goals, extra-institutional action, a degree of organization and some temporal continuity, one would be hard pressed to identify a U.S. immigrant rights movement prior to the 1980s.

This is no longer the case. Currently, one in eight U.S. residents was born in another country, and about 12 million of these people lack legal residency papers (Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera 2013). The hardships faced by those lacking legal status, as well as political and civil society challenges to the status, rights and benefits of all immigrants, legally resident or not, have generated a vibrant immigration movement. It is one of multiple streams, ranging from alliances between national immigrant rights groups and labor unions to local activism by young DREAM ACTivists (Nicholls 2013; Voss and Bloemraad 2010; Yukich 2013). Given that a core movement goal is legalization – something that can only be passed into law by Congress – winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of politicians and the public is central for the movement’s success. Consistent with others’ calls for cross-fertilization between social movement scholarship and allied fields of study (Andrews 1997; Andrews and Edwards 2004;

Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 124-129), we argue that understanding activism around immigration requires bringing concepts and processes identified by social movement scholars into conversation with the insights and methodological tools used by those who study public opinion and immigration.

In line with both social movement and public opinion scholarship, we conceptualize the question of resonance in terms of framing contests between movement proponents and opponents. We investigate frames focused on the economic benefits of migration versus job competition, on human rights versus citizenship appeals, and on family unity versus deportation logics. Which frames shift public opinion most? In evaluating frames, we build on citizenship theory, which makes conceptual distinctions between status, rights, identity, and participation (Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul 2008; Bosniak 2000; Joppke 2010). Empirically, we distinguish between two types of membership. One is related to physical presence and legal status, that is, who gets into a country and can stay there, which we measure through attitudes toward legalization. The second relates to the rights and benefits extended to people in a polity, which we measure through opinion on which groups should be able to access a range of publicly-provided benefits, from food stamps to in-state college tuition. In addition, we distinguish between rights claims couched in universal appeals (i.e., human rights) and those grounded in U.S. citizenship. Are the immigrant rights movement's chances for success hurt by cultural and legal assumptions of American citizenship that undergird the rhetoric of rights used by so many U.S. social movements?

We also borrow from public opinion research. Social movement scholars have long acknowledged the dangers of circular reasoning when studying framing dynamics (e.g., Benford 1997: 412; Benford and Snow 2000: 626; Ferree 2003: 305). Retrospective reconstructions of social movement activity often assume that the movement's eventual success indicates that frames were resonant or, if a movement fizzles, that a particular framing was faulty. To gain purchase on frame resonance, we adopt a methodological innovation from public opinion research: the survey experiment (Chong and Druckman 2007a; Druckman et al. 2006; Mutz

2011; Sniderman 2011). In a survey experiment, respondents are randomly assigned to distinct groups that receive questions with variation in wordings or in answer categories. A comparison of the randomized groups reveals how particular phrasing or answer options – the framing of an issue – affect people’s expressed attitudes and policy preferences.

Attention to public opinion research also encourages us to think in more nuanced ways about the different audiences embedded in the umbrella term “public discourse” or “public sphere” used by social movement scholars. Social movement researchers have identified multiple audiences (or targets) in assessing frame resonance, but they mostly distinguish between movement activists, potential recruits, the media and elites rather than sub-groups within the bystander public. Yet ways of thinking about issues often vary by one’s underlying beliefs and social location, which in turn could affect how resonant a frame feels. Sub-groups might vary along classic sociological divisions based on gender, race and class position or, as a growing body of political sociology and political science scholarship tells us, by contemporary ideological divisions in American society (e.g., Brooks and Manza 2013; Druckman, Peterson and Slothuus 2013). We use survey experiments to evaluate how potentially distinct “publics” might react differently to economic, rights and family unity frames.

To anticipate, we find that economic arguments, either for or against immigration, do little to shift opinion about legalization or the public benefits immigrants should be able to access. This is surprising given that economic arguments have been very prominent in public debates, perhaps because the “rationality” inherent in such cost/ benefit language is less inflammatory than alternative narratives (Stewart 2012). In contrast, we find strong resonance for the family unity frame. Critically, this frame moves a particular sub-group of the public to be more accepting of legalization: those who self-identify as politically conservative. The family frame does not, however, have significant effects on conservatives’ opinion on who can access benefits, underscoring the multi-faceted nature of immigrant membership. We also find that appeals to human rights, when juxtaposed with a language of “American citizens first,” is problematic for movement activists, as it moves politically moderate voters, the largest group in

our study, to exclude people without documents (or even legal residents without citizenship) from the circle of membership. A human rights appeal moves political liberals to more expansive attitudes on public benefits, but it does not significantly increase their support for legalization. In short, we find evidence that political ideology matters for frame resonance, adding weight to calls for sociologists to take political orientation and partisanship seriously. Perhaps surprisingly, framing effects do not differ much by other social groupings, such as by race, gender or education. We suggest that future research needs a more sophisticated account of framing resonance among sub-groups in the “public” and we conclude by underscoring how the normative bias towards a citizenship discourse hurts immigrant rights activism.

### **Framing in social movements and public opinion research**

The concept of “frame,” which can be traced back to Gregory Bateson (1954) and Erving Goffman (1972), was brought into the study of social movements and public opinion at nearly the same moment. The idea sparked distinct research agendas, however. For social movement scholars, the work of David Snow and his collaborators (Snow, et al 1986; Snow and Benford 1988) was foundational. Their call for attention to “framing” or “the struggle over the production of mobilizing” and “counter- mobilizing ideas” (Benford and Snow 2000: 613) was embraced by researchers eager to bring agency and culture into a field dominated by structural and organizational accounts of collective action. Snow and Benford distinguish several framing processes, but their notion of frame resonance stands out. At its root lies the contention that social movements are more likely to succeed when activists articulate their cause in terms that are legitimate and meaningful to people outside the movement, that is, when frames “resonate” with key beliefs, values and ideas held by ordinary people (Benford and Snow 2000: 621). As Ferree (2003) notes, resonance tends to be seen as the *sine qua non* of movement success. Many analyses trace, retroactively, how activists and opponents act as interpretive agents who produce and sustain collective action frames that resonate with participants and bystanders (e.g., Buffonge and Gordon 2001; Čápek 1993; Zuo and Benford 1995).

In contrast, public opinion researchers drew principally on William Gamson and Andre Modigliani's (1987, 1989) conception of "framing effects"—the idea that how an issue is described or labeled shapes opinion—to better understand public attitudes. Early research used framing effects as both conceptual framework and an empirical strategy. It showed dramatic effects in how wording or the highlighting of certain information could shift public attitudes (Nelson and Kinder 1996; Rasinski 1989; Zaller 1992). Many interpreted these shifts to indicate that most citizens were uninformed or had such fragmentary and conflicting views that their opinions could be easily manipulated by elites, posing a threat to democracy.

The more negative connotation of framing in public opinion stands in contrast to the more positive view among social movement scholars. Framing in public opinion also tends to employ a psychological lens, centered on individuals' schematic views of the world (Chong and Druckman 2007a). In social movement research, framing focuses more on social constructions of the world, in which interpretative processes link individual views to broader societal narratives and cultural orientations (Snow and Soule 2010).

These differences in theoretical and normative orientations might explain the limited dialogue between the two fields, a silence we seek to remedy. We advance the conversation in two ways: by contending that survey experiments are an innovative methodological strategy for social movement scholars concerned with circular reasoning in frame analysis, and by directing attention to public opinion and sub-groups analyses to understand resonance among the non-activist, bystander audience to framing contests.

### *Framing Contests, Circular Arguments and Survey Experiments*

Early public opinion research on framing effects found dramatic fluctuations in public attitudes partly because analysts would prime respondents with a single view on a topic. Subsequent research incorporated the awareness that in everyday life, individuals are exposed to competing framings of an issue (Sniderman and Theriault 2004); yet as Chong and Druckman (2007a: 113) note, the dynamics of framing in competitive contexts are still little



understood in public opinion research. In contrast, analysis of framing and counterframing contests have long been a staple of social movement research (see Benford and Snow 2000 for a review), but here, too, studies “fail to shed much light on the factors that tend to shape the outcomes of such contests, other than stating or implying the tautology that those who won employed the most resonant framings” (Benford and Snow 2000: 626).

To help tackle the problem of circular arguments, we borrow a methodological tool used by public opinion scholars, survey experiments. Survey experiments embed the logic of experimental design into opinion surveys, enabling researchers to measure how differences in the way a question is worded (or framed) affect responses. Researchers (or their computers) randomly assign respondents into groups, which then receive alternate versions of questionnaire items (Mutz 2011; Sniderman 2011).<sup>3</sup> Since assignment to different questions is randomized, causal inference is more straightforward and firmly grounded than in traditional surveys or retrospective accounts of movement success. This method offers a useful way for social movement scholars to study frame resonance, yet to our knowledge, only one study has been done from a social movements perspective, investigating framings of marriage equality for same-sex couples (Pizmony-Levy and Ponce 2013). We employ a survey experiment to see whether some immigrant rights movement frames are more effective than others in the court of public opinion.

#### *Targets of Framing Contests: The Differentiated Public*

In fact, the “court of public opinion” has been largely absent in analyses of frame resonance, arguably part of a more general disregard of public opinion in sociological studies of social movements (Burstein 1998; McAdam and Su 2002).<sup>4</sup> Disregard of public opinion occurs even though activists and social movement scholars often see changing the hearts and minds of the public as a key element in movement success. Such a goal is central to mobilization by and for immigrants, both to challenge negative public perceptions of “illegal” immigrants, as well as to get voters behind legislative actions on immigration reform.

The primary empirical strategy for those social movements scholars who have considered the “public sphere” has been to analyze discourse and claims-making in mass media. Koopmans et al (2005) and Ferree et al (2002) investigate cross-national differences in the claims articulated and debated among social movement actors, their opponents, and political elites as reported in the media. Perhaps ironically, given the interest in framing as an agentic and creative enterprise, both studies identify strong national patterns in discourses on immigration (Koopmans et al. 2005) and abortion politics (Ferree et al. 2002), which they attribute to differences in “opportunity structures” due to political institutions and national discursive norms. These media studies describe an amorphous public sphere, an audience to the “playing field” of discursive contestation (Koopmans et al. 2005: 18-21) or the “gallery” observing those engaged in speech acts (Ferree et al. 2002:10-12). While the idea of discursive opportunity structures helps explain cross-national variation, it implies structural forces such that only a few frames “win” in a society, irrespective of sub-groups in an audience.

We suggest that social movement scholars should conceptualize and measure the possibility of distinct sub-groups in the public, and evaluate frame resonance more consistently and rigorously using public opinion. Sub-groups are important since social movement accounts show that trade-offs exist: frames that persuade some people to become or remain activists can be counterproductive for winning the support of others (Mansbridge 1986; McVeigh, Myers and Sikkink 2004; Amenta 2006; McCammon 2012). Public opinion research tells us that when citizens are exposed to different views of an issue, they tend to choose the option that is most consistent with their values; alternatively, an individual’s underlying political orientations can reduce framing effects by increasing resistance to disconfirming information (Sniderman and Bullock 2004, Sniderman and Levendusky 2007).<sup>5</sup> Others emphasize how pre-existing attitudes, particularly those grounded in moral and ideological convictions, can moderate framing effects (Druckman 2001; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2001; Feinberg and Willer 2013). This work reminds us that the “public” is a heterogeneous category.

How and why might frames resonate differently for distinct sub-groups? Common categorizations in sociology, by gender, class, age or ethno-racial background, might matter to the extent that such sub-groups have common interests or experiences that shape worldviews. Yet we also know that wide variation can exist within these categories; some women, for instance, embrace progressive causes, others support conservative ones, and yet others are not interested in social or political causes at all. Given this, classification by political ideology might be a particularly useful. We can conceptualize political orientations as prisms, refracting the messages, or frames, articulated by social movement actors such that they resonate in distinct ways for different people. For example, Brooks and Manza (2013) build on the notion of heuristics to ask whether shifts in opinion about government responsibility during the Great Recession were affected by stratification beliefs, partisanship, or racial attitudes. They conclude that partisan groupings – strongly identified Republicans, strongly identified Democrats and Independents – are most relevant. Studies of public opinion on immigration and immigrants similarly find that partisanship or political ideology is one of the best and most consistent predictors of pro-immigrant and anti-immigrant attitudes (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Wilkes, Guppy and Farris 2008), even after controlling for demographic and socio-economic attributes.<sup>6</sup> We consequently examine whether political ideology might affect frame resonance and we consider how other sociological distinctions, by gender, race or class, might matter.

### **Framing in the Immigrant Rights Movement**

The framing options available to noncitizens vary in critical ways from those open to citizens, especially in a country such as the United States that is built on the idea that a common citizenship defines “the nation.” Implicitly (and sometimes explicitly), scholars of U.S. social movements have assumed the protesting *citizen* in their theoretical and empirical accounts of contentious politics, carefully excavating how appeals to the Constitution and the assumption of equality that come with citizenship have animated social movement claims.<sup>7</sup> This is evident

for conservative movements (gun ownership, right-to-work, anti-affirmative action movements), as well as for progressive ones (civil rights, women's rights, LGBT rights). Citizenship and rights are often conflated, with rights language constituting a powerful frame in the United States. As Snow and Benford noted years ago, the civil rights movement articulated a particularly resonant master frame around "the ideal of equal rights and opportunities regardless of ascribed characteristics" (1992: 146), a frame adopted by subsequent movements for Chicanos, gays and lesbians, women, native American and others (Benford 2013). Although rights do not need to be linked to citizenship (Soysal 1994), appeals to equal rights and social inclusion are deeply fraught for noncitizens, who may not be seen as legitimate members of the nation (Nicholls 2013; Yukich 2013).

Opponents and supporters of immigrants have articulated distinct frames depending on the social and political context of the day. Historically, immigrants were depicted as courageous settlers of the Western frontier, dangerous radicals and anarchists, or racially suspect foreigners who could bring impurity into the American nation (Tichenor 2009; Zolberg 2006). To identify present-day frames that may resonate with the public, we draw on empirical accounts of activism in the contemporary immigrant rights movement. The movement arguably began when immigrants and advocates rallied to oppose the 1994 California ballot initiative "Save our State," or Proposition 187, which sought to bar undocumented migrants from health care, public education and other social services.<sup>8</sup> The most dramatic moment of collective, non-institutional action came when millions of people took to the streets in the spring of 2006 to protest a House bill that would have criminalized being undocumented (Voss and Bloemraad 2011). Since then, young undocumented migrants or the children of deported parents have become visible through various high-profile protest activities, from stopping vehicles leaving deportation centers to the "DREAM 9" group's attempt to re-enter the United States despite prior undocumented status. We concentrate on framing contests in the 2006-2012 period, using the mass protests of 2006 as a starting point.

Although grounding the frames we evaluate in social movement activity might seem

obvious, this is not the predominant strategy among public opinion scholars. Much more common is the strategy used by Druckman, Peterson and Slothuus (2013) in their survey experiments that included views on the DREAM Act (proposed legislation to legalize undocumented young people). They selected study frames by first doing a content analysis of media coverage and then dichotomizing frames as “weak” or “strong” based on the opinions of 138 individuals not part of the main survey experiment (2013: 62). For those interested in social movement dynamics, this strategy raises a number of problems. First, media frames are a filtered subset of the many frames used by activists. Also, the strength or weakness of a frame must be evaluated in tandem with the actual content of frames since content gets to the heart of how an issue is socially constructed. We focus on three sets of frames: around economics, family unity and rights.

*“We are here to Work”: Economic Frames*

A variety of framing contests were on display during the 2006 protests, which brought 3.5 to 5 million people into the streets (Bloemraad, Voss and Lee 2011). In late March, marchers held banners and flags that proclaimed “*Somos una nación de inmigrantes* (We are a nation of immigrants),” “No human being is illegal,” “*Ya es Hora* (Now is the time),” and “Justice for Immigrants,” alongside American, Mexican and other flags. Negative reaction to the foreign flags and Spanish signs swiftly followed. In many cities, opponents and the media portrayed marchers as lawbreakers who refused to assimilate and were therefore unfit for citizenship (Martinez 2011; Vargas 2007).

The protesters and their allies understood the power of this counter-frame and worked assiduously to offset it (Baker-Cristales 2009; Martinez 2011; Vargas 2007).

One response highlighted the economic contributions of immigrants, bypassing legal citizenship by accentuating another kind of membership: as workers and consumers in the American economy. Highlighting immigrants’ economic contributions shifts membership claims away from formal legal status and also feeds into longstanding cultural and political

notions of the “good” American. As Shklar has argued (1991), earning and controlling one’s labor signals social standing and garners public respect. The frame of economic contributions was also powerful since it had been used previously to counteract opponents’ claims in the 1990s that immigrants were a drain on government coffers, and because it linked to a key movement tactic, boycotting work places and stores to underscore immigrants’ contributions.<sup>9</sup> Economic arguments have helped frame the cause of driver’s licenses for undocumented immigrants in Utah (Stewart 2012) and to promote the DREAM Act (Nicholls 2013).

### *Keeping Families Together: Framing Family Unity*

The origins of the contemporary family unity frame originate in the mid-1990s, when changes to federal immigration law increased the threat of deportation by increasing the grounds for removal and reducing judicial discretion. Legal changes, along with tighter border security, placed mixed status families at greater risk of being separated.<sup>10</sup> The family unity frame emphasizes the role of immigrants as parents and family members, including those in the home and not just the labor market.

During the 2006 protests, some activists amplified the frame into a critique of U.S. democracy for failing to value all families equally. In Denver, activists made an explicit link between family unity and the American ideals; as one activist put it, “you can’t say this [protest] is un-American because we’re saying family reunification is about American values” (Martinez 2011; see also Pallares and Flores-Gonzalez 2011). Emotional language of families torn apart also gained prominence in the highly publicized activism of Elvira Arellano, an undocumented Mexican migrant who sought sanctuary from deportation in her Chicago church, and who involved her young son in her activism. After 2006, as deportations climbed in the waning years of the Bush administration and rose further during the Obama presidency, more and more advocacy groups, legal aid organizations, non-partisan think tanks and academics have underscored the repercussions of deportation on family members (e.g., Chaudry et al. 2010; Dreby 2012).

### *Rights for Whom? Human and Civil Rights*

Eschewing Americanism as a discursive template, some groups and marchers in the 2006 protests adopted a human rights framing. Research in Europe and Japan has suggested that human rights appeals offer advocates a powerful discursive and legal framework to advance immigrant rights (Gurowitz 1999; Soysal, 1994). In 2006, human rights were primarily called upon as a set of values rather than a formal system of international law.<sup>11</sup> Slogans like “No human being is illegal” were put on placards and called out at rallies. Indeed, Sassen (2006) has suggested that a human rights frame is the best way to understand claims-making in the 2006 protests.

As a framing strategy, a “rights frame” stands out as among the small group of identifiable “master” frames, frames that span multiple social movements because they are sufficiently elastic, flexible and inclusive to be deployed by many movements and because they hold particular cultural relevance in their milieu (Benford and Snow, 2000: 619; see also Benford 2013). However, it is important to distinguish, conceptually and empirically, between different types of rights framings. Given alliances with and activism by labor movement groups, immigrant advocates sometimes employed the language of worker rights and sometimes drew parallels between immigrant and civil rights. In 2003, two labor unions, UNITE HERE and the SEIU, organized cross-country bus rides through 93 cities and towns under the banner of “Immigrant Worker Freedom Rides,” explicitly drawing parallels to the cause, tactics and language of black and white activists who protested segregation in 1961 by riding buses in the Deep South (Bloemraad, Voss and Lee 2011: 24). Indeed, what is sometimes referred to as a generic “rights” frame was, in the U.S. context, initially termed the “civil rights” master frame (Morris 1999; Snow and Benford 1992). In the contemporary immigrant rights movement, “rights” might relate to all humans, workers, or to civil rights.

We worry that a broad “rights” label elides a critical distinction between civil rights frames (and laws) and human rights frames (and laws). Appeals to human rights are moral and

philosophical claims to a system of values based on human dignity and equality (Merry et al. 2010); they apply irrespective of citizenship or birthplace. In contrast, “civil rights” are embedded in a particular American set of institutions (the Constitution, judicial review) and an implicit appeal to a narrative of U.S. citizenship, which, as we argue above, is problematic for immigrants. We consequently distinguish, conceptually and in our empirical analysis, between human rights frames and framings about the rights of U.S. citizens.

In addition, we build on conceptualizations of citizenship to examine both territorial access and status (legalization, for our purposes) and the rights and benefits open to those living in a polity. As a status, citizenship makes a hard distinction between those given formal membership versus those the state can bar from territorial access or who it can deport (Brubaker 1992; Joppke 2010). As a set of rights and benefits, however, citizenship distinctions have softened in the face of domestic liberal ideals or notions of equality based on common humanity (Bosniak 2006; Soysal 1994). In U.S. courts, what might be a legitimate exercise of sovereignty to exclude or remove noncitizens becomes less legitimate, in some cases, for allocating rights and benefits to different residents. For example, in *Plyer v. Doe*, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that children have the right to a public school education from kindergarten to grade 12, even if they lack legal status. But do ordinary members of the public make such distinctions? Just as we evaluate the possible distinction between human and “citizen” rights among the public, we also undertake an empirical examination of opinion on legalization compared with access to public benefits.

### *Other Frames and Voices*

These frames do not exhaust the many discursive appeals made by movement supporters and opponents. Opponents, in particular, have moved from a frame that views immigrants as a drain on government services to one labelling undocumented migrants as criminals and even potential terrorists (Dowling and Inda 2013; Stewart 2012). Movement advocates have attempted to combat this frame with portrayals of the law-abiding immigrant



(Yukich 2013). As we discuss below, we incorporate these framing battles into our survey experiment by using the term “illegal”<sup>12</sup> in question wording and we specify that legalization would follow “background checks.” Given data limitations, we do not, however, employ a distinct survey experiment for these framings. In fact, research constraints limited us to three framing contests, plus a base condition. Our final decision to assess economic, rights and family unity frames stems, in part, from a desire to evaluate the contention by Bloemraad, Voss and Lee (2011) that the most resonant frames in 2006 were those that centered on American values of family and work. They suggest that frames using the language of America’s immigrant past or human rights found limited resonance, possibly because both hinted at foreignness. “The American public,” they assert, seems to “need immigrants to make appeals to their Americanism” (Bloemraad, Voss and Lee 2011: 5). If valid, this assessment would have important implications for our understanding of how social movement actors can (and cannot) effectively frame immigrant rights, as well as the parameters that will shape—and constrain—the ongoing contest over membership and belonging in the United States.

## **Data and Methods**

To investigate framing resonance, we embedded an experiment in an Internet survey of registered California voters conducted by the Institute for Governmental Studies (IGS) in May 2013. California is an ideal site given the saliency of immigration debates since the early 1990s. The proportion of immigrants living in California—27 percent of all residents—is the highest in the country and the state is home to the nation’s largest undocumented population (Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera 2013). Because comprehensive immigration reform must go through the formal political system, passing both houses in Congress and garnering the President’s signature, the opinions of ordinary *voters* is particularly important for the success of the movement.

We used a random sub-sample of 1,935 survey respondents for our experiment.<sup>13</sup> These respondents compare well to the full population of California registered voters, as reported by

the California Secretary of State. While 44% of California's registered voters are Democrats and 29% Republicans, the percentages in the experimental subsample were 46 % and 29%, respectively. We find similar correspondence with a Field Poll probability sample of registered voters conducted in September 2012 for sex, party registration, and education (see Table 1). Participants in the IGS internet poll were, however, more likely to be born in the U.S., to be younger, and less likely to be married than Field Poll estimates, differences that may reflect who has access to and feels comfortable with computer-based technology. For our purposes, these modest limitations are not a serious concern since our experiment leverages random assignment *within* the sample to examine the effect of immigration frames on public opinion. Furthermore, past research suggests that the relationship between variables is less likely to be affected by sample selection than the overall levels of variables (Sanders et al. 2007).<sup>14</sup>

Table 1 about here.

Administering the survey experiment over the Internet, an increasingly common data collection method in public opinion research (Mutz 2011), has several advantages. Self-administered Internet questionnaires avoid interviewer effects and minimize social desirability bias compared to other modes of survey administration (Chang and Krosnick 2009; Holbrook and Krosnick 2010; Kreuter, Presser, and Tourangeau 2008), real concerns for a study of immigration attitudes (Janus 2010). Additionally, compared to telephone respondents, Internet respondents provide answers that are more reliable, less susceptible to satisficing, and have higher concurrent and predictive validity (Chang and Krosnick 2009).<sup>15</sup>

#### *Dependent variables*

Our main outcomes are attitudes about legalization and the provision of public benefits for immigrants. Respondents were asked whether illegal immigrants who could pass a background check should be offered permanent legal status in the United States with a path to citizenship, permanent legal status without a path to citizenship, or no change in legal status.<sup>16</sup> Substantively, these choices reflected the three main legislative options being debated by

federal politicians. Conceptually, they tap views on the most basic element of state membership, namely the right to residence and citizenship status.

Respondents were then asked, immediately following, a set of questions about seven publicly-provided benefits: access to public elementary and high schools; in-state tuition for public colleges and universities; social security benefits for those who work and their families; emergency health care; Medicare and Medicaid; food stamps; and welfare benefits.<sup>17</sup> For each benefit, respondents were asked whether it should be available to U.S. citizens only, available to U.S. citizens and all legal immigrants, or available to U.S. citizens and all immigrants, both legal and illegal.<sup>18</sup> These benefits have past and current political salience, in California and nationally. They cover a range of government actions that might be conceptually and empirically distinct in the minds of the American public, spanning opportunity-promoting measures (e.g., education), social insurance schemes (e.g., social security), and redistribution programs (e.g., welfare) (McCall and Kenworthy 2009). Some respondents might also see certain benefits as basic human rights (e.g., primary education, emergency health care, food assistance). As a matter of membership, this question probed the boundaries demarcating ‘insiders’ who should be allowed to receive taxpayer-provided benefits from ‘outsiders’ who should not have access.

### *Experimental design*

We designed an embedded experiment in which participants were randomly assigned to one of three frames—economic, family, human rights/ US citizenship—or to the control condition. By design, the probability of being assigned to the control condition (.32) was higher than the probability of being assigned to one of the three treatments (.23). The primary treatment consisted of a phrase inserted into the legalization question. The control condition did not include an additional phrase. The three phrases were:

- Some say such immigrants contribute to economic growth while others say that illegal immigrants take American jobs.<sup>19</sup>

- Some say illegal immigrant parents should be deported to their homeland, while others say that we should keep families together.
- Some say we need to protect everyone’s human rights, even illegal immigrants, while others say we need to protect the rights of U.S. citizens first and foremost.

We thus offered both a ‘pro’ and a ‘con’ argument that shared an economic, family, or rights frame. We deliberately structured questions in this way to recognize that framing contests are precisely that—they involve advocates and opponents who articulate competing claims over an issue. Indeed, research suggests that introducing competing arguments increases attention to information and motivates people to evaluate arguments more systematically (Chong and Druckman 2007b; Druckman and Nelson 2003).

Respondents were subsequently presented with the public benefits questions. All respondents in the three treatment conditions were prompted to answer these questions, and half of the respondents in the control condition were randomly assigned to this set of questions (see Figure 1).<sup>20</sup> To increase the salience of the frames, respondents in the treatment conditions read one of three parallel introductory phrases prior to the public benefits questions:

- Given the debate about illegal immigrants and the economy...
- Given the debate about illegal immigrant families...
- Given the debate about citizenship and human rights...

Figure 1 about here.

#### *Additional variables*

The survey also captured additional information about the respondents. We do not use this information to model our outcome, since respondents were allocated to the control questions or one of the three framing treatments through random assignment. Variables likely to correlate with our outcome of interest, such as political ideology and ethno-racial background, should consequently be balanced (subject to chance variability) across the control

and treatment groups.<sup>21</sup> Instead, we use these variables to conduct sub-group analyses of how frames might resonate differently, in strength and even direction, among different types of people. Existing scholarship is quite clear that attributes such as age, education, ethnicity and political ideology matter in explaining one's opinion on immigration (e.g., Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Citrin and Sides 2008; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). What we do not know, however, is whether and how much these particular attributes might *interact* with social movement frames. Put differently, are women more likely to respond to language that primes family concerns, or are people with lower income more likely to shift their opinion in the face of economic frames?

To consider how frames might interact with individual characteristics, we focus on age, ethnicity, nativity, gender, education, income, marital status, religiosity, and political ideology.<sup>22</sup> These are key attributes identified in prior research on anti-immigrant opinion or attitudes on social benefits. We are particularly interested in political ideology since we hypothesize that the effect of framing battles will be refracted by one's orientation to the political world, especially on a policy-relevant issue like immigration. Political ideology was initially measured using respondents' self-placement on a 1 to 7 scale, ranging from strong liberal to strong conservative. We recode this variable into three groupings: "Liberals" (1-2), "Moderates" (3-5) and "Conservatives" (6-7).<sup>23</sup>

### *Analytic approach*

To assess the effects of the frames on support for legalization and access to public benefits, we use the partial proportional odds model, a special case of the generalized ordered logit. This model allows us to take advantage of the ordinal nature of our dependent variables. On legalization, the status quo option (no change) is more restrictive than the option of permanent residency without a path to citizenship, and this in turn is more restrictive than the option of permanent residency with a path to citizenship.<sup>24</sup> The public benefits response options are similarly ordered from a more restrictive to more expansive notion of membership: survey

participants are asked if only citizens; legal immigrants and citizens; or illegal immigrants, legal immigrants and citizens should have access to each of the seven public benefits.

Unlike the widely used proportional odds model, the partial proportional odds model does not assume that the effect of an independent variable on the odds of being in a higher rather than a lower category is the same for all the outcome categories. Substantively, it allows us to consider situations in which a particular frame might affect the odds of support for permanent residency with or without citizenship rather than the status quo, but not assume the same effect on the odds of favoring a path to citizenship over just permanent residency or the status quo.

Formally, the generalized order model can be written as:

$$P(Y_i > j) = g(X\beta_j) = \frac{\exp(\alpha_j + X_i\beta_j)}{1 + [\exp(\alpha_j + X_i\beta_j)]}, j = 1, 2, \dots, M - 1$$

where  $M$  is the number of categories of the ordered dependent variable ( $M=3$  in our case, for both legalization and public benefits),  $g$  is the link function (the logit link, in our case),  $X$  is a vector of values for the explanatory variables for the  $i$ th observation,  $\alpha$  is a vector of category-specific thresholds, and  $\beta$  is a vector of coefficients. Note that  $\beta$  is indexed by  $j$ , indicating that the  $\beta$  coefficients can vary with the levels of the dependent variable. In the case of the ordered logistic model, the  $\beta$ 's are restricted to be the same for all values of  $j$ . Though this assumption is unrealistic in most empirical research (Williams 2006), restricting none of the  $\beta$  coefficients can lead us to estimate more parameters than necessary, since the proportional odds assumption is sometimes warranted. In the partial proportional odds model, some of the  $\beta$  coefficients can be constrained to be the same for values of  $j$ , while others are allowed to differ.<sup>25</sup> We first test whether the proportional odds assumption is met at the  $p < .05$  level, and then we relax the constraint on the  $\beta$  coefficients for the parameters that do not meet the assumption (Williams 2006).

## Results

We first report results for the legalization question, then the public benefits questions. As discussed above, these questions tap, conceptually, different aspects of status and rights. A robust political and legal scholarship has debated these distinct notions of membership, but we know little about whether the general public recognizes such distinctions or how frames might resonate in one area but not the other.

### Legalization attitudes

A clear majority of California registered voters in our sample support permanent residency and a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants (ranging from 53.5% to 58.5% across the different frames). However, a substantial minority (26.3% to 35.1%) supports the status quo, while a small group (10.4% to 15.4%) supports restricted legalization—permanent residency without a path to citizenship (Figure 2). These results roughly echo national polls conducted in spring 2013: similar proportions of registered Californian voters and national respondents opposed legalization; among those who favor legalization, a somewhat higher proportion of Californians support a path to citizenship.<sup>26</sup>

Figure 2 about here.

### *Frame resonance: economics, families and rights*

How do these attitudes vary by frame? Perhaps surprisingly, given widespread use of economic arguments among supporters and detractors of legalization, respondents who receive the economic frame hardly differ from those who do not receive a frame. Indeed, the percentage in each response category in the economic frame is within one point of the base response. In contrast, registered voters exposed to the family frame are less likely to support the status quo—no legal change—than those in the base condition (26.3% vs. 31.5%). Lower support for the status quo corresponds with greater support for legalization without a path to citizenship (15.4% vs. 10.4%), but very similar percentages supporting a path to citizenship (58.3% vs. 58.1%). Finally, and perhaps most surprisingly, California registered voters exposed

to the rights frame expressed both lower support for a path to citizenship (53.5% vs. 58.1%) and greater support for the status quo (35.1% vs. 31.5%), compared to base condition respondents. In fact, respondents exposed to the frame pitting human rights against “U.S. citizens first and foremost” are the least likely to support the most expansive option, and the most likely to support the most restrictive option.

To assess the statistical significance of these differences, we estimate a partial proportional odds model. The estimates in Table 2 capture the association between each frame and the likelihood of supporting a more generous immigration policy than the specified threshold. Thus, the parameters in the first column— $y >$  no legal change—refer to the chance that respondents will be supportive of at least some legalization option (permanent residency with or without a path to citizenship) compared to respondents exposed to the family frame. The parameters in the second column— $y >$  permanent residency, no citizenship—compare support for the most generous option, legalization with citizenship, to more restrictive scenarios.<sup>27</sup> We find, in comparison to the control group, that only the effect of the family frame achieves marginal significance (Table 2, left panel). Individuals exposed to the family frame are more likely to support some type of legalization, though they are no more likely to support a path to citizenship. It is also informative, given activists’ debates over the relative effectiveness of different frames, to compare frames to each other rather than just to the control condition. Re-running the partial proportional odds regression with the family frame as base shows that respondents exposed to the family frame are significantly more likely to support some path to legalization compared to those in the rights condition (Table 2, right panel). These results hint at the possible exclusionary valence of U.S. citizenship, as juxtaposed to a human rights appeal, when it comes to undocumented immigrants. Conversely, the language of family appears to promote a more inclusionary view of membership.

Table 2 about here.

*Sub-groups and frame resonance: the importance of political ideology*



The effects of the frames, although suggestive, are fairly mild. Effects measured for the full sample—conceptually understood as an undifferentiated “public”—may, however, obscure heterogeneity across sub-groups. Do different groups of registered voters respond to these frames in distinct ways?

First, it is important to recognize that individual attributes clearly matter in understanding legalization preferences. As seen in Table A1 in the Appendix, compared to white respondents, African Americans, Latinos, and respondents that identify as "other" are more supportive of immigrant legalization. Latinos are the most supportive: 71% back a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants. Further, while only 19% of respondents 18-24 support maintaining the status quo, this number rises to 35% for those over 35. We also see some modest differences by marital status and income. In contrast, we find few differences in opinion based on religiosity, sex, birthplace, or education. Importantly for our purposes, opinion on legalization varies significantly by political ideology, with 78% of liberals supporting legalization and a path to citizenship, compared to 57% of moderates and only 32% of conservatives.

How do framings resonate across these sub-groups? It matters most depending on respondents’ political ideology. As seen in Table 3, self-identified conservatives are more supportive of immigrant legalization and a path to citizenship in the family condition compared to the control condition. Indeed, the full-sample positive effect of the family frame on support for legalization is largely driven by the change in conservatives’ opinions. The predicted probability of supporting the status quo falls sharply—24 points—for conservatives exposed to a family frame compared to the control condition: from 64% to 40% (Figure 3). Additionally, although full-sample analysis showed no statistically significant change in the percentage of individuals willing to support a path to citizenship, among conservatives, the predicted probability of support for this option increases from 25% to 47%. Opinion among liberals and moderates, on the other hand, is not statistically significant when they receive the family frame rather than the control condition.

Table 3 about here.

Figure 3 about here.

Sub-group analysis by political ideology reveals a second framing effect, one hard to discern in the full-sample analysis. When viewing respondents as an undifferentiated public, we found that those exposed to a rights framing were somewhat less likely to support legalization of any type, but the effect was not statistically significant. Table 3 reveals, however, that a framing contest between human rights and the rights of U.S. citizens affects the views of moderates, rather than those on ideological poles, and that this effect is statistically significant.<sup>28</sup> Compared to the control condition, the rights frame increases moderates' predicted probability of supporting the status quo by 10 points—from 28% to 38%. Similarly, moderates' predicted likelihood of supporting permanent residency with a path to citizenship drops from 61% in the control condition to 49% in the rights condition. These results suggest that a human rights discourse does not move opinion for ideologically moderate registered voters; rather, the language of U.S. citizenship – powerful in making inclusion claims for other U.S. social movements – may hurt immigrant activists' ability to sway public opinion.

In line with the results for the undifferentiated sample, the economic frame does not have a statistically significant effect on the legalization attitudes among liberals, moderates, or conservatives. This is perhaps surprising given that liberals and conservatives often have different views on economic policy and redistribution. The lack of effect might be because ordinary voters do not respond to immigration as primarily an issue of economics, despite political rhetoric, a conclusion reached by other scholars studying general views on immigration (Sides and Citrin 2007; Schneider 2008). It could also be a sign of a stalemate in framing battles that prime economic arguments.

Beyond political ideology, we examined whether other categorizations, such as grouping people by gender, ethno-racial background, education and the like, showed distinct patterns of frame resonance. To our surprise, alternate sub-group specifications mattered little, and they were much less consequential than political ideology.<sup>29</sup> By this, we do not mean that

these other sub-groups do not matter for opinion on legalization – as we indicate above, self-reported Latinos are amongst the most supportive of a pathway to citizenship – but rather that the effects of framing and, by extension, frame resonance, do not differ in statistically significant ways across these sub-groups. Men and women respond to the family or rights frame in similar ways, as do people of different ethno-racial and education backgrounds. The big story is that the prism of political ideology refracts framing effects in distinct directions.

### Attitudes on public benefits

Conceptually, questions on legalization and citizenship tap a hard, “outer” boundary of membership. Legal status determines one’s very right to reside in the United States and be a member of the polity. A related aspect of membership, one that is theoretically and substantively separate, focuses on the rights individuals hold and/or the benefits they can access. Status and benefits do not necessarily overlap. Historically, U.S. citizenship status did not guarantee African Americans access to social security. In the contemporary period, U.S. law requires hospitals to provide emergency health care irrespective of legal status or ability to pay. Various theorists have suggested that rights and benefits constitute a “softer,” internal set of membership distinctions (Bosniak 2006; Joppke 2010). We consequently examine separately frame resonance for questions on who should be able to access various publicly provided benefits.

We find that a large majority of California registered voters in our sample do *not* believe that illegal immigrants should have access to public elementary and high schools, in-state tuition to public colleges and universities, social security for workers and their families, emergency health care, Medicare and Medicaid, food stamps, or welfare benefits (Table 4), although the level of support varies by benefit. For example, while 43% of respondents in the base condition support access to emergency health services for everyone, including illegal immigrants, only nine percent support access to welfare benefits for all. Indeed, support for universal access rarely surpasses 13 percent, a very different response from the almost 70% of

registered voters supporting some sort of legalization. The difference is consistent with the idea that legal status and benefits might be distinct things in the minds of U.S. voters.<sup>30</sup>

Table 4 about here.

*Frame resonance: economics, families and rights*

How might framing contests influence views on benefits? California registered voters exposed to the economic frame are more supportive of illegal immigrants' access to public benefits compared to base condition respondents across all benefits except for welfare. Yet exposure to the economic frame, compared to the base condition, also increased support for citizens-only access for certain benefits. This hints at a polarizing effect, though very slight, with respondents moving to either a "citizens only" or a universal access stance for four of seven benefits. None of the shifts are, however, large.

Respondents subject to the rights frame were slightly more supportive of access to benefits for illegal immigrants, and less supportive of restricting benefits to citizens, compared to those not exposed to a frame. This expansive shift contrasts with how the rights frame lowered support for legalization. The expansive pattern holds for all seven benefits, but the effects are quite small: on average, the percentage in each response category differs only 2.2 points compared to the base category.

Finally, respondents exposed to the family frame show no consistent pattern of variation across the public benefits – they are more supportive of access for illegal immigrants than the base in some, less in others. This result is a bit surprising, given that the family frame produced the strongest effect on opinion on legalization; when it comes to benefits, however, family frame respondents were more similar to individuals in the base condition than those exposed to the other frames.

To assess the statistical significance of these differences, we conducted partial proportional odds regressions for each benefit (see Table A2 in the Appendix). Compared to the base condition, only the economic frame reaches significance in any of the regressions, and

it does so for only one benefit: respondents exposed to the economic frame are marginally more likely to support expansive access to emergency health care. Little evidence of statistical significance is unsurprising given the small differences seen in Table 4.

*Sub-group analysis: the continued importance of political ideology*

As with legalization, demographic variables affect views on extending public benefits to immigrants, and they are largely consistent with the earlier results. For example, liberals support more expansive positions on both legalization and benefits provisions. Compared to white respondents, African Americans and Latinos are less supportive of restricting benefits to citizens. Young respondents (18-24) are more likely to support inclusionary benefits than older respondents. At the same time, although foreign birthplace was not significantly associated with views on legalization, those born outside the United States are more supportive than native-born respondent of allowing immigrants to access public benefits. Similarly, although education did not affect legalization attitudes, those with a graduate or professional degree are more supportive than those with a high-school degree or less in granting immigrants access to public elementary and high schools, in-state tuition, and social security.<sup>31</sup>

These effects do not, however, imply that frames will resonate differently across these attributes. Indeed, sub-group analysis reinforces the importance of political ideology for frame resonance. Regression results in Tables 5-7 compare, separately for each political ideology grouping, the three frames to the no frame condition with respect to a change in the likelihood of choosing some immigrant access rather than citizens-only access for benefits (the first column), and the likelihood of choosing to support universal access rather than a more restrictive option (second column). Among liberals, the rights frame has a positive effect for all seven benefits, reaching at least marginal significance for five of seven benefits (Table 5). In contrast, and consistent with the findings on legalization, ideological moderates react to the rights frame by moving to a more exclusionary position for six of the seven benefits, although the substantive effects are modest and only views about public elementary and high schools

achieve marginal statistical significance (Table 6). This implies that liberals react to the mention of human rights (or against U.S. citizenship) by moving to a more inclusive position, while moderates do the reverse, reacting against a human rights frame (or in favor of a U.S. citizens “first” frame) to support greater exclusion.<sup>32</sup> Liberals’ predicted probability of supporting universal access to public elementary and high schools increases by 15 points—from 46% to 61%—as a result of shifting from the control group to the rights condition. In contrast, moderates’ support for illegal immigrant access to public elementary and high schools decreases from 31% in the control condition to 23% for those in the rights condition (see Figure 4). For conservatives, the rights frame has a largely inconsistent and insignificant effect (Table 7). The full-sample positive effect of a right framing appears, then, to be mostly driven by liberals’ change in opinion.

Tables 5-7 about here.

Figure 4 about here.

In contrast to the rights frame, neither the economic nor the family frame has a clear and statistically significant effect on liberals, moderates, or conservatives. The effect of the family frame is insignificant and inconsistent across the three ideological groups. Although the economic frame increases the likelihood that moderates will support citizens-only access to public elementary and high schools significantly, the effect is inconsistent across the other six benefits. For all seven benefits, the economic frame increases support for immigrant access among liberals and decreases support among conservatives, but none of these effects reach statistical significance.<sup>33</sup> Beyond political ideology, framing effects for other sub-groups had fewer significant interactions than we would expect by chance alone.<sup>34</sup>

## **Conclusion**

Our findings suggest that while many sociologists and political theorists might hope that appeals to human rights can expand the circle of membership, such a frame does not help the immigrant rights movement among California registered voters. This is especially the case

when it comes to building support for legalization. If membership is understood as access to certain publicly provided benefits, then a human rights frame appears to move opinion among those we might expect to be sympathetic: self-identified political liberals. However, among the much larger group of political moderates, we find evidence that a competing discourse highlighting the rights of U.S. citizens sways opinion toward *exclusion* from permanent membership as well as from benefits such as public schooling. This finding is in line with qualitative analyses by Bloemraad, Voss, and Lee (2011) and Nichols (2013), who suggest that claims-making by immigrants finds resonance only to the extent that activists are able to argue that immigrant groups are already “de facto” Americans. While human rights appeals might resonate well among academics and political progressives, it appears to hurt the cause of the immigrant movement among large segments of the ordinary public.

In contrast, and perhaps surprisingly given its prevalence in the public debate, an economic framing of immigration does little to sway public opinion, whether we ask about legal status or access to benefits. This might be because the public is divided on the economic consequences of immigration (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013), or because economic arguments cut across the usual political lines. Aristide Zolberg (1999) has argued that the politics of immigration in the United States has historically been one of “strange bedfellows,” as business interests line up with cultural cosmopolitans on the left to support more immigration, and unions partner with cultural conservatives on the right to oppose migration (see also Tichenor 2009). While plausible historically, this no longer appears to be the case today; if it were, we would have expected somewhat different results for legalization (favored by large business interests) compared to benefits (often opposed by those same interests). Instead, we found that the economic frame had little resonance in shifting opinion in either case (see also Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Harell et al. 2012). Potentially more useful is Zolberg’s identification of both an economic and cultural dimension to immigration politics. Future research should build on the framing experiments done here to evaluate the resonance of cultural unity versus diversity frames in moving public opinion.

The most expansive change in attitudes supporting the legalization of undocumented migrants occurred when the issue is framed as about family unity. This result is noteworthy given how language around marriage equality has also led to advances for the LGBT movement, suggesting a more broadly applicable lesson about the framing resonance of “family” discourses among the American public. However, our empirical examination reveals that, at least for immigrant membership, a family frame only produces more expansive attitudes among self-reported conservatives on the question of legalization. Framing access to public benefits as an issue of family had no significant effect on this other facet of membership.

We were surprised to find virtually no framing effects for other sub-groups traditionally of interest to sociologists, such as groups distinguished by gender, ethno-racial background, economic status, and the like. The lack of frame resonance across these sub-groups could be a product of the competing frames we used in the survey experiment, since research suggests that exposure to competing frames reduces framing effects. In this respect, the set of robust and significant effects we did find for political ideology stand out, indicating that frame resonance might well differ dramatically across political groups in the general public. Future research needs to probe the impact of differential framing effects further across sub-groups in what has largely been theorized by social movement scholars to be an undifferentiated “public.”

Having demonstrated the potential for survey experiments to reveal how conceptually distinct frames resonate with different sub-groups, we hope that other scholars will adopt survey experiments and begin to investigate frame resonance for other social movements. We will then be able to understand better the extent to which claims making in the name of noncitizens differs fundamentally from that of the citizen-protesters assumed by social movements theory.

Finally, our results suggest a correction to, or at least caution about, existing theorizing on rights frames and social movements in the United States. The rights “master” frame, articulated first in the civil rights movement and later borrowed by almost every American social movement, is inaccessible to noncitizens, at least in the minds of many in the public.



Moreover, the alternate framings investigated here resonate with—at best—one political subgroup of the American public and, dauntingly, frames that resonated with one group often alienated others. Our findings consequently underscore the distinct challenges immigrant activists confront when making claims for legalization, social inclusion and the membership of the undocumented in the United States.

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## ENDNOTES:

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<sup>1</sup> Our thanks to Jack Citrin and Gabe Lenz for their assistance with the survey, to the members of the faculty workshop on immigration, framing and rights at UC-Berkeley for comments on earlier drafts, and to the Institute for Governmental Studies, the Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, and the Social Science Matrix, all at UC-Berkeley, for financial support.

<sup>2</sup> Immigrants—foreign-born individuals—only made up one in twenty U.S. residents at the time, and most had acquired U.S. citizenship. Labor movements like the United Farm Workers included immigrants, but immigrant advocacy was not front-and-center among their concerns. In contrast, scholars in Europe have long conceptualized immigrants as “challengers” or political outsiders who need to use non-electoral collective action to have their voice heard.

<sup>3</sup> We describe the simplest form of survey experiments; researchers are increasingly using more complex designs. See Mutz 2011 for a very useful overview and discussion.

<sup>4</sup> To the extent that public opinion has been addressed in social movement scholarship, the focus centers on whether protest is more efficacious than public opinion at explaining congressional voting (McAdam and Su 2002; Soule and Olzak 2004; Agnone 2007). These studies vary in their assessment, with Agnone (2007) offering the most robust analysis in his investigation of environmental legislation. He shows that both protest and public opinion influence congressional action, but the biggest impact occurs when rising public support is accompanied by protest. Yet neither he nor other scholars ask about how protestors’ framings might have shaped public support, or might shape the opinion of distinct publics differentially.

A partial exception is the work of political scientist Taeku Lee (2002). Lee’s work challenges the dominant view in the political science literature that grassroots activism is much less efficacious than elite behavior in explaining political attitudes. His study of black insurgency and racial attitudes in the civil rights era demonstrates that racial attitudes were first changed in response to civil rights organizations and activism, and only later did changed attitudes influence the policy agendas of political elites. Lee also demonstrates that public opinion subgroups matter, as we argue here. However, his question is not about which frames were resonant among all frames offered by the civil rights movement; instead, he focuses on temporal change and the sequence of attitudes, social movement activism and policy change.

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<sup>5</sup> Recently, a few researchers have suggested that public opinion scholars should reconsider their negative normative assessment of framing effects, noting that stability of opinions can indicate dogmatism as well as reasoned principles, and that citizens who change their minds in light of alternative arguments are as essential for democracy as those who maintain stable attitudes (Chong and Druckman 2007a). Social movements and political opinion literatures on framing effects might be slowly moving closer together.

<sup>6</sup> In comparison, individual economic self-interest has limited purchase in explaining attitudes (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Harell, et al. 2012; but see Scheve and Slaughter 2001), though a general sense that the economy is doing well or poorly can help explain over time or cross-national differences (Wilkes, Guppy and Farris 2008; Quillian 1995). Individual-level beliefs about cultural homogeneity and nationalism also shape attitudes about immigrants and immigration, as do contextual-level variables centered on group threat, be it economic, demographic, or cultural (see Ceobanu and Escandell 2010 for a review). Contextual-level variables cannot be easily addressed with survey experiments, as they require variation across place and time.

<sup>7</sup> By “noncitizen,” we mean those who do not have a formal, legal status as a citizen or national and who can, therefore, be deported. We cognize that in U.S. history, various social groups have been denied federal citizenship (e.g., following the *Dred Scott* decision) or have been “second-class” citizens without the full rights we associate with citizenship (e.g., women’s lack of suffrage). We nonetheless highlight non-citizenship out of a concern that assumptions about the inclusive nature of citizenship and rights frames run the risk of analytical nationalism, ignoring how citizenship creates social and legal closure against those outside its boundaries (Bosniak 2006; Brubaker 1992; Joppke 2010).

<sup>8</sup> One could push the starting point back to the 1982 *Plyer v. Doe* decision, guaranteeing undocumented children access to K-12 public schools – perhaps a decision akin to *Brown v. Board of Education* – or to legislative efforts that resulted in the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which legalized about 3 million individuals. However, *Plyer* and IRCA were, on balance, elite-driven efforts fought out in courtrooms and the back rooms of Congressional offices rather than the product of mass mobilization.

<sup>9</sup> The economic contribution frame was criticized by some activists for elevating economic contributors above others (Baker-Cristales 2009), while the use of boycotts also sparked fierce internal debate.

<sup>10</sup> Mixed-status families are those in which some family members (often children) are citizens or have legal status while others (often parents) are undocumented.

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<sup>11</sup> See Merry, et al. 2010 for a useful discussion of this distinction, as well as how human rights law and civil rights law play out differently in the women’s rights movement.

<sup>12</sup> A note about language: in the text that follows, we use the word “illegal” when we are quoting or discussing the questions in the survey experiment. Otherwise, we use the term “undocumented” migrant.

<sup>13</sup> Survey respondents were recruited by Survey Sampling International (SSI) via opt-in recruitment methods.

<sup>14</sup> In the results section we test whether framing effects differ across demographic groups, including those for which our sample is less representative. We find that the frames affect respondents of different age groups and nativity similarly, and that our main findings are robust to the statistically significant interaction between the family frame and marital status.

<sup>15</sup> Participant attentiveness is a concern with self-administered surveys. Because our experimental manipulation was built into the question wording, it was imperative that respondents read questions carefully. The IGS survey consequently incorporated two screener questions to test whether respondents carefully read the question text. Respondents who failed either screener question—19% of the total—were dropped from the sample. Cases with missing information were dealt with through listwise deletion.

<sup>16</sup> The full text of the question posed in the control condition is: “There is a lot of discussion about changing the legal status of the approximately 11 million illegal immigrants now living in the U.S. Should illegal immigrants who can pass a background check be offered: (1) Permanent legal status in the U.S. and chance to become citizens; (2) No change in legal status; or (3) Permanent legal status in the U.S. but not a chance to become citizens.” In the treatment conditions, an additional phrase was included after the first sentence, as per below. We purposely used a question that might bias responses to a more negative view through explicit reference to 11 million “illegal” immigrants to ensure sufficient variation in respondents’ answers. Other opinion polls taken around this time indicated that support for legalization might be as high as 83% for “a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants if they met certain requirements, like paying fines and back taxes, passing criminal background checks and learning English” (NYT poll, May 1, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/05/01/us/domestic-poll-graphic.html?ref=politics>). When opinions are highly favorable or strongly negative, researchers face ceiling and floor effects – that is, it is hard for opinions to move up, or down, respectively.

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<sup>17</sup> The legalization and public benefits questions were the first set of attitudinal questions on the survey, mitigating potential order or priming effects from other questions on the survey.

<sup>18</sup> The full text of the question in the control condition is: “Now I am going to ask you about a series of public benefits, and who should be able to use them. For each, could you tell me whether it should be available to U.S. citizens only, available to U.S. citizens and all legal immigrants, or available to U.S. citizens and all immigrants, both legal and illegal.”

<sup>19</sup> Key phrases were highlighted to draw respondents’ attention to the question wording.

<sup>20</sup> The other half were assigned to questions related to another experiment in the survey.

<sup>21</sup> We formally checked whether our covariates were balanced across conditions. Almost all variables used in this analysis (age, religiosity, ethnicity, political ideology, foreign birthplace, marital status, education) were balanced. Women are somewhat overrepresented in the control condition compared to the treatment groups and individuals with family income between \$60,000 and \$99,999 are somewhat underrepresented in the economic frame. All results are robust to controlling for sex and income.

<sup>22</sup> Coding for these variables was as follows: age (18 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 49, 50 to 64, and 65 and over), ethnicity (white, African American, Asian, Latino, other), foreign birthplace (foreign=1), gender (male=1), education (high school degree or less, some college, college, postgraduate degree), income (less than \$30,000; \$30,000-59,999; \$60,000-99,999; \$100,000 and over), marital status (single, married, separated/divorced/widowed, domestic partnership), religiosity (attend religious services once a week or more, sometimes, or almost never).

<sup>23</sup> We prefer political ideology over partisanship for a number of reasons. First, formal measures of model fit, such as the Bayesian Information Criterion and McFadden’s pseudo R-squared for model selection indicate better model fit for ideology over partisanship. Second, we have less missing information for ideology than partisanship (N of 1792 to 1631, respectively, for the legalization question). Finally, conceptually, we feel that ideology better captures the idea that world views might interact with frames as distinct moral cues or normative preferences. Measured this way, 23% of registered California survey respondents indicated they were “Liberals,” 59% are “Moderates” and 18% are “Conservatives.”

<sup>24</sup> While citizens and legal permanent residents are treated similarly in many aspects of life in the United States, non-citizens, even those with legal residency papers, always face a possibility of deportation, usually in the event of committing a crime, or of losing their legal status, for example, if they are out of

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the country for more than one year. Only citizens enjoy absolute access to U.S. territory and formal membership in the full political system.

<sup>25</sup> We use the `gologit2` (Williams 2006) command in Stata 12.1 to estimate the partial proportional odds model.

<sup>26</sup> A national Pew Research Center survey, which used very similar question wording and answer categories, found that 43% of respondents favored legalization with a path to citizenship, 24% favored legalization without citizenship, and 27% opposed legalization. (Two percent responded “I don’t know.”) <http://www.people-press.org/2013/03/28/most-say-illegal-immigrants-should-be-allowed-to-stay-but-citizenship-is-more-divisive/>

<sup>27</sup> Coefficients from the two thresholds are identical when the proportional odds assumption is met at the  $p < .05$  level.

<sup>28</sup> While both liberals and conservatives are slightly more supportive of legalization in the rights condition, these effects do not achieve significance.

<sup>29</sup> Only two categories had significant interactions with the frames. Married respondents are more supportive of immigrant legalization when exposed to the family frame, while single respondents are less supportive. As married individuals are more likely to be conservative than single respondents, further multivariate analyses confirm that the marital interaction is partly, but not fully accounted for by difference in political ideology. The economic frame, compared to the control condition, also decreases support for immigrant legalization among individuals with a family income between \$60,000 and \$99,999, while slightly increasing support for legalization among individuals with incomes under \$30,000. This result is not robust to a continuous specification of income and is inconsistent through the income scale. Given three treatments and multiple demographic and socio-economic variables, we would expect some statistically significant results due to chance alone. Results of these analyses are available upon request.

<sup>30</sup> Among our respondents, a small group of people supported the status quo on legalization *and* benefits for undocumented immigrants, providing further support for the argument that legal status and benefits are distinct things in the minds of American voters. It should also be underscored that public opinion differs from the actual law and regulations determining access to the benefits we list. Undocumented children’s access to K-12 public schools was affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1982 *Plyer v. Doe* decision. In California, undocumented students have been permitted to pay in-state college tuition under AB 540 since 2002. Federal law mandates emergency medical care regardless of legal status. The

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eligibility rules for Medicare, Medicaid, food stamps (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program) and welfare (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) are more complex. Undocumented immigrants are barred from access – though they can sometimes receive benefits on behalf of citizen children – while the eligibility of legal non-citizens depends on their visa status, their length of residence and (sometimes) their work history. See Bitler and Hoynes (2013) for an overview of these intricacies.


<sup>31</sup> Full results available upon request.

<sup>32</sup> Although we present separate models for liberals, moderates, and conservatives, a full model with interaction effects confirms that resonance of the rights frame varies significantly by political ideology. The interaction between being moderate, rather than liberal, and the rights frame, rather than the base condition, is negative for all seven benefits and statistically significant at  $p < .05$  for four benefits and at  $p < .1$  for one of the benefits. The interaction between being conservative, rather than liberal, and the rights frame, rather than the base condition, is also negative for all seven benefits, but only achieves statistical significance for access to emergency health services. Full results available upon request.

<sup>33</sup> The full model with interaction effects confirms that there is no significant interaction between political ideology and the family frame for any of the seven public benefits. Compared to its effect on liberals, the economic frame leads moderates to be significantly more likely to support restricting access to public elementary and high schools to citizens. Similarly, compared to its effect on liberals, the economic frame makes conservatives marginally significantly less supportive of immigrant access to emergency health services. None of the other interactions are statistically significant. Full results available upon request.

<sup>34</sup> Full results available upon request.


**Figure 1.** Overview of Experimental Design



Note: Solid lines indicate that everybody who received the treatment in the legalization question, also received the treatment in the set of public benefits questions. The number next to the dashed lines is the probability that a respondent in the preceding group was randomly selected to the subsequent group.


<sup>a</sup> In the family frame treatment, one respondent did not answer the access to elementary and high schools question, bringing the total of respondents for this benefit to 447.

**Figure 2.** Percentage answering that illegal immigrants should be offered permanent residency & citizenship, permanent residency but no citizenship, or no legal change, by frame






**Figure 3.** Predicted probability of supporting permanent residency and a path to citizenship, or no legal change, by frame and political ideology



**Figure 4.** Predicted probability of supporting immigrant access to benefits, by frame and political ideology



**Table 1.** Comparison of selected characteristics of sample with 2012 Field Poll of California registered voters

	<b>IGS Framing Experiment (May 2013)</b>	<b>Field Poll (September 2012)</b>
<b>Party Registration</b>		
Democratic	46%	46%
Republican	28%	31%
Non-partisan/ Decline to state	17%	18%
Other	9%	5%
<b>Sex</b>		
Male	45%	49%
Female	55%	51%
<b>Age</b>		
18-24	16%	11%
25-34	18%	15%
35-49	19%	19%
50-64	31%	24%
65 & over	16%	30%
<b>Education</b>		
High school or less	15%	19%
Some college	37%	33%
College degree	31%	26%
Graduate or Professional Degree	17%	21%
<b>Marital status</b>		
Single, never married	34%	29%
Married	43%	56%
Separated/divorced/ widowed	19%	14%
Domestic partnership	5%	--
No answer	--	1%
<b>Birthplace</b>		
In the US	93%	83%
Outside the US	7%	17%
<b>Race/Ethnicity<sup>a</sup></b>		
White	65%	
African American	6%	
Asian	9%	
Latino	15%	
Other	6%	
N	1935	1183

<sup>a</sup> The race/ethnicity questions are not comparable between these surveys because the ethnicity (Hispanic/not Hispanic) is asked separately from race in the Field Poll.

**Table 2.** Ordered (partial proportional odds) regressions on support for more or less expansive immigrant legalization options, by frame

	y > No change	y > Permanent residency, no citizenship		y > No change	y > Permanent residency, no citizenship
<i>(Reference: Base)</i>			<i>(Reference: Family)</i>		
Family	0.245+ (0.134)	0.016 (0.123)	Base	-0.254+ (0.136)	-0.011 (0.124)
Rights	-0.176 (0.123)	-0.176 (0.123)	Rights	-0.415** (0.148)	-0.196 (0.137)
Economic	0.028 (0.124)	0.0278 (0.124)	Economic	-0.209 (0.150)	0.0081 (0.137)
Constant	0.785*** (0.081)	0.321*** (0.079)	Constant	1.030** (0.106)	0.336** (0.095)
N		1,935	N		1,935

Standard errors in parentheses.

+ p<0.1; \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01 (two-tailed tests).

**Table 3.** Ordered (partial proportional odds) regressions on support for more or less expansive immigrant legalization options, by political ideology and frame

	<b>Liberal</b>		<b>Moderate</b>		<b>Conservative</b>	
	> No change	> Permanent, no citizenship	> No change	> Permanent, no citizenship	> No change	> Permanent, no citizenship
Family	-0.183 (0.312)	-0.183 (0.312)	0.051 (0.177)	-0.251 (0.163)	0.984** (0.307)	0.984** (0.307)
Rights	0.474 (0.347)	0.474 (0.347)	-0.469** (0.167)	-0.469** (0.167)	0.220 (0.306)	0.220 (0.306)
Economic	-0.004 (0.317)	-0.004 (0.317)	-0.114 (0.172)	-0.114 (0.172)	0.379 (0.297)	0.379 (0.297)
Constant	1.864** (0.223)	1.232** (0.206)	0.941** (0.112)	0.444** (0.108)	-0.549** (0.196)	-1.102** (0.203)
N	420		1,055		317	

Standard errors in parentheses.

+ p<0.1; \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01 (two-tailed tests)

**Table 4.** Percentage answering that only citizens, citizens and legal immigrants, or all individuals deserve access to the following benefits, by frame

	<b>Base</b>	<b>Family</b>	<b>Rights</b>	<b>Economic</b>
<b>Public schools</b>				
Citizens only	11.7	11.2	11	15.4
Citizens & legal	58.9	56.4	57.4	51
All	29.5	32.4	31.6	33.7
<b>In-state tuition</b>				
Citizens only	25.9	26.6	23.4	26.9
Citizens & legal	60.8	62.7	62.3	59.6
All	13.3	10.7	14.4	13.5
<b>Social security</b>				
Citizens only	35.9	36.2	34.3	36.8
Citizens & legal	56.3	55.1	55.7	52.4
All	7.8	8.7	10	10.8
<b>Emergency health care</b>				
Citizens only	12.6	11.2	11.9	11.5
Citizens & legal	44.3	41.7	41.9	38.2
All	43	47.1	46.2	50.2
<b>Medicare and Medicaid</b>				
Citizens only	36.9	33.9	31.4	31.7
Citizens & legal	52.8	54.7	56.2	56.3
All	10.4	11.4	12.4	12
<b>Food stamps</b>				
Citizens only	35.9	34.2	31.9	33.7
Citizens & legal	51.1	54.5	54.5	52.2
All	12.9	11.4	13.6	14.2
<b>Welfare</b>				
Citizens only	40.1	38.4	37	38
Citizens & legal	50.8	54	52.8	52.9
All	9.1	7.6	10.2	9.1
<b>N</b>	309	448 <sup>a</sup>	411	416

<sup>a</sup> One respondent in the family treatment condition did not answer the “public schools” question, for a total N of 447.

**Table 5.** Ordered (partial proportional odds) regression on support for immigrant access to benefits for liberals, by frame

	<b>Public schools</b>		<b>In-state tuition</b>		<b>Social security</b>		<b>Emergency health services</b>	
	>citizens	> legal	>citizens	> legal	>citizens	> legal	>citizens	> legal
	only	immigrants	only	immigrants	only	immigrants	only	immigrants
Family	0.075 (0.318)	0.075 (0.318)	-0.105 (0.338)	-0.105 (0.338)	-0.057 (0.326)	-0.057 (0.326)	0.209 (0.329)	0.209 (0.329)
Rights	0.611+ (0.322)	0.611+ (0.322)	0.608+ (0.334)	0.608+ (0.334)	0.606+ (0.323)	0.606+ (0.323)	0.829* (0.345)	0.829* (0.345)
Economic	0.298 (0.317)	0.298 (0.317)	0.193 (0.335)	0.193 (0.335)	0.233 (0.320)	0.233 (0.320)	0.485 (0.332)	0.485 (0.332)
Constant	2.104** (0.291)	-0.153 (0.250)	1.633** (0.286)	-1.284** (0.278)	1.000** (0.259)	-1.714** (0.273)	2.128** (0.299)	0.281 (0.254)
<b>Medicare &amp;</b>								
	<b>Medicaid</b>		<b>Food stamps</b>		<b>Welfare</b>			
Family	0.126 (0.323)	0.126 (0.323)	0.144 (0.324)	0.144 (0.324)	0.065 (0.331)	0.065 (0.331)		
Rights	0.616+ (0.323)	0.616+ (0.323)	0.462 (0.321)	0.462 (0.321)	0.458 (0.330)	0.458 (0.330)		
Economic	0.371 (0.320)	0.371 (0.320)	0.228 (0.321)	0.228 (0.321)	0.108 (0.328)	0.108 (0.328)		
Constant	1.027** (0.261)	-1.530** (0.270)	1.204** (0.266)	-1.305** (0.268)	1.053** (0.269)	-1.713** (0.281)		

N=347 for all benefits.

Standard errors in parentheses.

+ p<0.1; \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01 (two-tailed tests)

**Table 6.** Ordered (partial proportional odds) regression on support for immigrant access to benefits for moderates, by frame

	<b>Public schools</b>		<b>In-state tuition</b>		<b>Social security</b>		<b>Emergency health services</b>	
	>citizens	> legal	>citizens	> legal	>citizens	> legal	>citizens	> legal
	only	immigrants	only	immigrants	only	immigrants	only	immigrants
Family	0.003 (0.195)	0.003 (0.195)	-0.307 (0.198)	-0.307 (0.198)	-0.116 (0.195)	-0.116 (0.195)	0.054 (0.186)	0.054 (0.186)
Rights	-0.358+ (0.205)	-0.358+ (0.205)	-0.165 (0.207)	-0.165 (0.207)	-0.188 (0.203)	-0.188 (0.203)	-0.029 (0.194)	-0.029 (0.194)
Economic	-0.594* (0.259)	0.047 (0.214)	-0.160 (0.209)	-0.160 (0.209)	-0.231 (0.210)	0.337 (0.297)	0.301 (0.197)	0.301 (0.197)
Constant	2.192** (0.183)	-0.811** (0.156)	1.184** (0.162)	-1.916** (0.174)	0.687** (0.156)	-2.454** (0.199)	1.888** (0.166)	-0.319* (0.148)
<b>Medicare &amp;</b>								
	<b>Medicaid</b>		<b>Food stamps</b>		<b>Welfare</b>			
Family	0.060 (0.193)	0.060 (0.193)	-0.164 (0.192)	-0.164 (0.192)	-0.153 (0.192)	-0.153 (0.192)		
Rights	0.040 (0.200)	0.040 (0.200)	-0.085 (0.201)	-0.085 (0.201)	-0.161 (0.201)	-0.161 (0.201)		
Economic	0.167 (0.202)	0.167 (0.202)	-0.055 (0.202)	-0.055 (0.202)	-0.058 (0.202)	-0.058 (0.202)		
Constant	0.619** (0.153)	-2.269** (0.178)	0.739** (0.155)	-2.014** (0.173)	0.532** (0.153)	-2.416** (0.186)		

N=869 for public schools, and 870 for all other benefits.

Standard errors in parentheses.

+ p<0.1; \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01 (two-tailed tests)



**Table 7.** Ordered (partial proportional odds) regression on support for immigrant access to benefits for conservatives, by frame

	<b>Public K-12</b>		<b>In-state tuition</b>		<b>Social security</b>		<b>Emergency health services</b>	
	>citizens	> legal	>citizens	> legal	>citizens	> legal	>citizens	> legal
	only	immigrants	only	immigrants	only	immigrants	only	immigrants
Family	0.135 (0.384)	0.135 (0.384)	0.234 (0.365)	0.234 (0.365)	0.264 (0.352)	0.264 (0.352)	0.013 (0.348)	0.013 (0.348)
Rights	0.312 (0.381)	0.312 (0.381)	0.065 (0.357)	0.065 (0.357)	0.113 (0.348)	0.113 (0.348)	-0.318 (0.339)	-0.318 (0.339)
Economic	-0.082 (0.375)	-0.082 (0.375)	-0.285 (0.345)	-0.285 (0.345)	-0.026 (0.341)	-0.026 (0.341)	-0.449 (0.337)	-0.449 (0.337)
Constant	1.576** (0.291)	-1.967** (0.305)	0.536* (0.259)	-3.495** (0.425)	-0.048 (0.253)	-3.714** (0.445)	1.937** (0.285)	-0.643* (0.255)
<b>Medicare &amp;</b>								
	<b>Medicaid</b>		<b>Food stamps</b>		<b>Welfare</b>			
Family	-0.014 (0.352)	-0.014 (0.352)	-0.060 (0.353)	-0.060 (0.353)	0.091 (0.357)	0.091 (0.357)		
Rights	-0.002 (0.346)	-0.002 (0.346)	0.046 (0.341)	0.046 (0.341)	0.153 (0.345)	0.153 (0.345)		
Economic	-0.088 (0.343)	-0.088 (0.343)	-0.035 (0.339)	-0.035 (0.339)	-0.026 (0.342)	-0.026 (0.342)		
Constant	0.169 (0.254)	-3.458** (0.422)	-0.011 (0.250)	-3.244** (0.389)	-0.210 (0.252)	-3.678** (0.443)		

N=269 for all benefits.

Standard errors in parentheses.

+ p<0.1; \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01 (two-tailed tests).

## APPENDIX

**Table A1.** Support for various immigrant legalization measures, by selected respondent characteristics

	<b>No legal change</b>	<b>Permanent residency only</b>	<b>Permanent residency &amp; citizenship</b>
<b>Political ideology<sup>a</sup></b>			
Liberal	13%	9%	78%
Moderate	30%	13%	57%
Conservative	55%	13%	32%
<b>Sex</b>			
Male	30%	12%	57%
Female	31%	11%	57%
<b>Race/Ethnicity<sup>a</sup></b>			
White	36%	11%	53%
African American	24%	15%	61%
Asian	26%	16%	58%
Latino	16%	13%	71%
Other	23%	9%	68%
<b>Birthplace</b>			
In the US	31%	12%	57%
Outside the US	24%	15%	61%
<b>Age<sup>a</sup></b>			
18-24	19%	15%	66%
25-34	25%	14%	61%
35-49	35%	13%	52%
50-64	35%	11%	54%
65 & over	34%	8%	58%
<b>Education</b>			
High school degree or less	27%	13%	60%
Some college	32%	11%	57%
College degree	33%	11%	56%
Graduate or Professional Degree	30%	12%	58%

*(continued)*

## APPENDIX

**Table A1.** *(continued)*

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<b>Income<sup>a</sup></b>			
<\$30,000	27%	11%	62%
\$30,000-\$59,999	31%	12%	58%
\$60,000-\$99,999	34%	12%	53%
\$100,000+	31%	11%	58%
<b>Marital status<sup>a</sup></b>			
Single, never married	25%	12%	63%
Married	35%	11%	54%
Separated/divorced/ widowed	34%	10%	57%
Domestic partnership	29%	17%	54%
<b>Religious service attendance</b>			
At least once a week	33%	12%	55%
Sometimes	31%	13%	57%
Almost never	30%	12%	59%

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<sup>a</sup> These variables have a significant effect on immigrant legalization views. Running partial proportional odds models, we find that compared to liberals, moderates and conservatives are significantly less supportive of immigrant legalization. Compared to white respondents, African American, Latino, and respondents that identify as "other" are more supportive of immigrant legalization. Compared to respondents with family incomes under \$30,000, respondents with family incomes between \$60,000 and \$99,999 are less supportive of immigrant legalization. Compared to respondents who are single, respondents who are married, separated, divorced, or widowed are less supportive of immigrant legalization. Compared to respondents who are 18-24 years of age, respondents who are 35 and older support more restrictive immigrant legalization positions. Full results are available upon request.

**APPENDIX**

**Table A2.** Ordered (partial proportional odds) regression on support for immigrant access to benefits, by frame

	<b>Public schools</b>		<b>In-state tuition</b>		<b>Social security</b>		<b>Emergency health services</b>	
	>citizens	> legal	>citizens	> legal	>citizens	> legal	>citizens	> legal
	only	immigrants	only	immigrants	only	immigrants	only	immigrants
Family	0.115 (0.145)	0.115 (0.145)	-0.098 (0.148)	-0.098 (0.148)	0.014 (0.143)	0.014 (0.143)	0.157 (0.140)	0.157 (0.140)
Rights	0.093 (0.148)	0.093 (0.148)	0.121 (0.151)	0.121 (0.151)	0.109 (0.146)	0.109 (0.146)	0.114 (0.143)	0.114 (0.143)
Economic	-0.288 (0.190)	0.181 (0.155)	-0.031 (0.151)	-0.031 (0.151)	0.044 (0.146)	0.044 (0.146)	0.252+ (0.143)	0.252+ (0.143)
Constant	1.992** (0.132)	-0.860** (0.115)	1.068** (0.118)	-1.910** (0.127)	0.541** (0.111)	-2.309** (0.131)	1.880** (0.123)	-0.264* (0.109)
<b>Medicare &amp;</b>								
	<b>Medicaid</b>		<b>Food stamps</b>		<b>Welfare</b>			
Family	0.125 (0.144)	0.125 (0.144)	0.020 (0.142)	0.020 (0.142)	0.026 (0.143)	0.026 (0.143)		
Rights	0.236 (0.146)	0.236 (0.146)	0.148 (0.145)	0.148 (0.145)	0.136 (0.147)	0.136 (0.147)		
Economic	0.214 (0.146)	0.214 (0.146)	0.105 (0.145)	0.105 (0.145)	0.076 (0.146)	0.076 (0.146)		
Constant	0.544** (0.112)	-2.185** (0.128)	0.603** (0.112)	-1.973** (0.125)	0.417** (0.112)	-2.381** (0.133)		

N=1,583 for public schools, and 1,584 for all other benefits.

Standard errors in parentheses.

+ p<0.1; \* p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01 (two-tailed tests)