Do Minimum Wages Really Reduce Teen Employment? Evidence from the United States

Productivity, Investment in Human Capital and the Challenge of Youth Employment

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Outline



History of the Federal MW



2007: \$5.85 to \$7.93





2010: \$7.25 to \$9.04





Number of SMW>FMW



Who are MW workers?



Who are MW workers?



Importance of MW

- Politically debated for years
- Three decades of declining real wages
- Recent declines in family incomes
 - -8.1% or \$4,400 since 2007
- Significant increases in student loans
- Huge gap and growing trends in inequality

4th Generation MW research

- Builds upon G1-G3
- Local case studies
 - Card & Kruger NJ/PA (2000)
- National panel studies
 - Neumark & Wascher (2007, 2000)
- Replicates and refutes "old-consensus" estimates on employment -1% to -3%

IRLE on forefront of MW research

 Do Minimum Wages Really Reduce Teen Employment? Accounting for Heterogeneity and Selectively in State Panel Data

Allegretto, Dube & Reich Industrial Relations April 2011

 Minimum Wage Effects Across State Borders: Estimates Using Contiguous Counties

Dube, Lester, Reich *Review of Economics and Statistics* November 2010

Recall importance of Teens

- 1/3 of MW workers are teens
- 43% of teenage workers are MW earners
- MW workers are disproportionally:
 - Young
 - Female
 - High school degree or less
 - Hispanic or African American

Teen EPOPs



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and National Bureau of Economic Research. Data are seasonally adjusted.

Teen EPOPs by Region



Panel data 1990-2010

- Current Population Survey (CPS)
 - Estimates monthly unemployment rate, etc.
 - Individual-level repeated cross-section
 - Widely used in research
- CPS is merged w/macro variables that capture variation in aggregate labor demand & supply
- Merge with MW variables

Canonical Fixed Effects Model

$$y_{ist} = \beta M W_{st} + X_{ist} \Gamma + \lambda \cdot unemp_{st} + \phi_s + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{ist}$$

- *MW* refers to the log of the minimum wage
- *i, s*, and *t* denote: individual, state & time indexes
- X is a vector of individual characteristics
- *unemp* is the quarterly unemployment rate in state *s* at time *t*
- ϕ_{s} refers to state fixed effects
- T_t represents quarterly time dummies
- Standard errors clustered at the state level

Building FE Specification

(1)
$$y_{ist} = \beta M W_{st} + X_{ist}\Gamma + \lambda \cdot unemp_{st} + \phi_s + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{ist}$$

(2) $y_{ist} = \beta M W_{st} + X_{ist}\Gamma + \lambda \cdot unemp_{st} + \phi_s + \tau_{dt} + \varepsilon_{ist}$
(3) $y_{ist} = \beta M W_{st} + X_{ist}\Gamma + \lambda \cdot unemp_{st} + \phi_s + \psi_s \cdot t + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{ist}$
(4) $y_{ist} = \beta M W_{st} + X_{ist}\Gamma + \lambda \cdot unemp_{st} + \phi_s + \psi_s \cdot t + \tau_dt + \varepsilon_{ist}$

•Importance of controlling for unexplained heterogeneity

Wage Effects

		(1FE)	(2)	(3)	(4ADR)
All Teens	η	0.123***	0.161***	0.165***	0.149***
	se	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.025)	(0.024)
16-17	η	0.197***	0.224***	0.221***	0.220***
	se	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.033)
18-19	η	0.074**	0.115***	0.120***	0.093***
	se	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.033)
Division-specific time controls State-specific time trends		:	Y -	- Y	Y Y

Employment Effects

		(1FE)	(2)	(3)	(4ADR)
All Teens	η	-0.118**	-0.036	-0.034	0.047
	se	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.027)	(0.024)
16-17	η	-0.232**	-0.077	-0.071	0.101
	se	(0.028)	(0.043)	(0.032)	(0.032)
18-19	η	-0.053	-0.010	-0.020	0.018
	se	(0.021)	(0.034)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Division-specific time controls State-specific time trends		-	Y -	- Y	Y Y

MW Employment Time Paths



Hours Effects

		(1FE)	(2)	(3)	(4ADR)
All Teens	η	-0.074**	-0.054	-0.001	-0.032
	se	(0.035)	(0.048)	(0.040)	(0.042)
16-17	η	-0.070	0.002	-0.011	0.038
	se	(0.042)	(0.074)	(0.044)	(0.073)
18-19	η	-0.090**	-0.092*	-0.011	-0.079*
	se	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.042)
Division-specific time controls State-specific time trends		-	Y -	- Y	Y Y

ADR main results for teens

Specification		(1 FE)	(4 ADR)
		0.400***	0 4 4 0 ***
A. wages	η se	0.123*** (0.026)	0.149^^^ (0.024)
B. Employment	coeff	-0.047**	0.019
	se ŋ	(0.022) -0.118**	(0.024) 0.047
C Hours	n	-0 074**	-0.032
0.110010	se	(0.035)	(0.042)

Y

Y

Division-specific time controls State-specific time trends

Local case study



DLR generalizes local case study design



DLR County pairs



-Average Difference in Minimum Wages in Pairs with a Differential

DLR main results for restaurants

Specification		(1 FE)	(6 DLR)
A. Earnings	η se	0.224*** (0.033)	0.188*** (0.060)
B. Employment	η se	-0.211** (0.095)	0.016 (0.098)
C. Labor demand elasticity		-0.787* (0.427)	0.079 (0.286)
County pair X period du State-specific time tren	ummies ds		Y Y

DLR Employment (1) and (6)



Discussion of results

- Monopsony at work?
- Other positive effects of MWs
 - Does not kills jobs, but job vacancies
 - Decreases turnover
 - Decreases recruiting & training costs
 - Increases productivity
 - Elevates pressure on government support
 - MW as stimulus

Widening Wedge of Wage Inequality



Widening Wedge of Wage Inequality



Summary

- ADR and DLR are strong evidence against conventional wisdom of negative employment effects.
- Failure to account for critical differences in employment patterns coupled with MW changes results in biased estimates—localized estimates are better.
- Spurious estimates are common and sizeable both for low wage sectors such are restaurants and for low-wage groups such as teens. This explains why the 3G studies were wrong.
- Our estimates are robust using multitude of data sources: QCEW, CBP, QWI, Census/ACS, CPS

THANKYOU!

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