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SURVIVING IN A CHANGING AND OFTEN HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT: THE BERKELEY INSTITUTE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

Academic institutions dealing with controversial subjects are fair game for attack from all sides. How Berkeley's Institute of Industrial Relations (recently renamed the Institute for Research on Labor and Employment) dealt with this problem – especially under Clark Kerr – is the main subject of this paper.

Interest in the field of Industrial Relations at Berkeley goes back as far as the 1920's when Berkeley's then closely intermeshed College of Commerce and Economics Department included a nucleus of influential economists interested in labor. Most notably of these were Ira ("Doc") Cross, Paul Taylor, and Charles Gulick (all lived to ripe old ages). In the mid-1930s Cross was first arbitrator for the longshore industry, giving the union a major win in one of his first decisions. (Kerr held this job later on.) Earlier, in the 1920s Berkeley Extension sponsored a Labor School in San Francisco, in some ways the forerunner of our present Labor Center. Another Berkeley economist, Solomon Blum, wrote what was possibly the first textbook specifically on industrial relations.¹

Nationwide the immediate post-war period might be called academic Industrial Relations "Golden Age". The post-war wave of strikes had made labor relations the country's number one social problem – or so many Americans thought, including the a large cohort of returning veterans (such as myself) who jammed universities, courtesy of the GI Bill. In 1947, for example, Labor was the most popular "field of interest" listed by members of the American Economics Association.² At Berkeley, as elsewhere departments throughout the late 1940s and 1950s, courses associated with industrial relations, were popular in a variety of departments, for example, , Personnel Psychology, Labor Economics, Organizational Sociology, and Collective Bargaining in the Business School. Kerr's own course, Business Administration 150, held in Wheeler Auditorium, drew up to 400 students. Kerr was an outstanding lecturer.)

The Institute's immediate history begins with a lunch held sometime in 1944 between then University President Robert Gordon Sproul and then Governor Earl Warren. Fearing that the end of the war would lead to a resumption of the especially bitter labor-management battles which had marked California during the 1930's, the Governor wondered whether the University might enlarge its educational offerings to include industrial and labor relations and so help facilitate what he later called "open and honest labor-management relationships." Warren may well have been influenced by the fact that his fellow Republican, New York Governor (and rival for the Presidential nomination) Tom Dewey, had just proposed what became the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations. As Kerr put it later:

The impression I took away from Warren was he wanted to change the image of California for the sake of attracting industry as a place that wasn't either riven with

class conflict as in Northern California or under the domination of right-wing reactionaries as in Southern California. He wanted a more moderate point of view. Somehow or other we were supposed to help, chiefly by getting the two sides together and educating leaders on both sides. In short, what Warren wanted was to provide a neutral ground in which labor and management could meet, with academicians providing research input. He saw the Institute as playing a bridging role.³

Sproul was not unprepared for the Governor's proposal. The Berkeley faculty (especially E. T. Grether, then Dean of the Business School) had been much concerned with the postwar period⁴. Further, Sproul had a long memo proposing a new labor relations program, sent to him by Paul Dodd (later the UCLA Institute's first Director) which was then passed on to Warren. Grether was active in the early planning, and in fact in December 1944 wrote language for possible inclusion in the Governor's forthcoming budget message.

Grether proposed that the new program, be housed in an Institute. Upping the ante, the Governor, in his January 8, 1945 "State of the State" address to the Legislature, recommended that instead of an Institute, a School of Industrial Relations to be established at Berkeley and Los Angeles.⁵ The Governor argued that "the techniques in this field [industrial relations] are at least as important as those in the fields of business management and technological advancement for which our schools offer special training."

The Governor's proposal met considerable opposition, particularly from conservative and agricultural interests which viewed unions as socialistic or communistic. After almost being defeated, the proposal passed just before the Legislature adjourned, and only after the Governor exerted considerable political clout. Though downgrading the School to an Institute and reducing its proposed appropriation, the Legislature gave its approval on July 17, 1945. The final bill provided for the establishment of "an institute of industrial relations and the maintenance of courses in Industrial Relations and extension activities and research in connection therewith, utilizing the full resources of the University of California and especially its faculties and facilities on the Berkeley and Los Angeles campuses of said University."⁶

The Governor's message, the language of the authorizing bill, and the reports of the campus and University state-wide committees which set the direction for the new Institute, all made it clear that the Institute would have two goals. Its first was to engage in research and the provision of research apprenticeships for graduate students. But as did many other U.C. Organized Research Units, it had a second goal: to provide educational services for the community -- and especially for unions and management. In fact, as the Governor saw it, one of the Institute's main tasks would be community relations: conferences, workshops, and courses. Further, the Governor felt the Institute should be concerned with education at the high school level.

The expectation was that the Institute's two functions namely research and community service would be mutually reinforcing: the Institute's contacts in the community would facilitate research; meanwhile its research would form the basis for its community outreach programs. Sixty years later the Institute still plays these two roles although coordination between the two may be weaker

Once the law was signed a joint administration-faculty committee was appointed at Berkeley to give the Institute direction. The committee's report gave strong support for giving the Institute a dual role. Quoting from the report:⁷

The Institute should ... emphasize the point of view that the public welfare encompasses the interests of all segments of society... requires testing the actions of all groups ... against certain recognized principles basic to our democracy. [There should be the] closest possible integration between the community and the campus activities of the Institute. [A major aim] should be to make an impact on the community by offering facilities for training personnel, for interchanging ideas, and for disseminating the products of academic research.

[In programs there should be a] mixing of labor and management to provide interchange of thoughts and viewpoints for the sake of encouraging understanding, tolerance, and the habit of mutual association.

The Institute should center on a research core [and research findings should be utilized in the various conferences and classes]. Feeding information back and forth between the world of labor relations and the research center should be constant....The research program should be the major means of bridging the gap between the University and the community in the field of industrial relations.

Three main issues had to be resolved before the Institute could get going. The first was whether there should be only one Institute, to be located at Los Angeles, or two, one at Berkeley and the other at Los Angeles. After much debate it was finally decided to establish two Institutes, but they were to be closely coordinated by a committee (under Vice President Harry Wellman) to report directly to Sproul.

The next decision involved the Institutes' relationship to teaching departments. Berkeley had assumed its Institute would be in the Business School. Los Angeles would have placed it in Economics. Eventually both were made independent.

The last question was who would be Director at Berkeley. After a careful search the committee picked Clark Kerr, then a thirty-three year old full professor at the University of Washington, and in doing so it passed over several possible internal candidates. Kerr, who received his PhD from Berkeley, was a first-rate scholar and already had a strong record of publications. Equally important, he had established a considerable reputation as

a neutral practitioner while working on the War Labor Board⁸. The search committee's file included recommendations from numerous labor and management notables, including a very strong, unsolicited letter from Dave Beck, later president of the Teamsters' Union (and still later jailed for tax fraud and theft).

The Kerr years

The Regents appointed Kerr as Director in December 1945.⁹ The Institute moved into its new quarters on the second floor of California Hall (now the Chancellor's office) during the spring and summer of 1946 though it was not fully staffed until 1947. The fact that the Institute obtained such a key campus location was early evidence of Kerr's political skills.

In staffing the Institute Kerr's intent was to draw on academicians from a broad range of departments. Of the initial appointees three came from Business Administration and one from Social Welfare but this list was soon expanded. The list eventually included Economics, Business, Political Science, Sociology, Psychology, Social Welfare and Law. For the most part Institute faculty were well rewarded: they held joint appointments, two-thirds in their teaching departments and one-third plus a two months summer appointment from the Institute¹⁰. So Institute faculty earned more and taught less than did their colleagues with just departmental appointments..

Kerr made strategic use of the availability of part-time Institute positions to influence appointments in teaching departments such as Sociology and Economics. As described by Professor Emeritus Joseph Garbarino.⁹

When he [Kerr] found someone he wanted to hire he would approach the appropriate Department and propose that they consider the person for an appointment. In return, when the Departments were recruiting someone they thought might, or *usually would not* [emphasis added], fit in the Institute they would get Clark to agree to pick up one-third of their salary to offer a reduced teaching load to close the deal.

Among those with part-time Institute appointments with minimal industrial relations interest were Harvey Leibenstein, Roy Radnor, West Churchman, and Fredrick Balderston. The Institute also provided the first home for the Center for Research in Management Science (now the Fisher Center for Management and Management Technology in the Haas School of Business). For the most part these faculty had short-term appointments.

By contrast the bulk of the new appointees were interested in collective bargaining, broadly defined. With some exceptions they were expected to teach in their subject matter department, to do research relevant to industrial relations and also to work with the community. Indeed Kerr was something of a task master. A witticism attributed to

him: when asked what “one-third time” amounted to his reply was “All the rest of your time.

In this way Kerr introduced industrial relations-related courses into the teaching departments. But he was less successful in integrating these courses across campus into some sort of “group major” which would “avoid duplication... Everybody wanted to give human relations”, he said. “I ran across increasing resistance by the departments that some institute should have something to do with what they offer. They all looked upon themselves as a self-contained unit.”¹¹

In addition to faculty Kerr brought in two outside staff people, both with War Labor Board experience, Ron Haughton who was put “In Charge of Labor-Management Relations” and later Lloyd Fisher, a one-time Research Director of the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen became Associate Director.

Eventually, to strengthen community ties Kerr brought in practitioners, for the most part on a part time basis, as “community representatives”. These included, for example, Teamster Business Agent (and later US Congressman) Jeffrey Cohelan and Robert Grunsky, Director of the California Metal Trades Association, then a major employers association. At first, however, Kerr was reluctant to do this. “I was concerned that the programs [be] more or less balanced. I did not want the labor side to become anti-employer and the employer-side to be anti-labor.” So the major early programs were organized largely by Kerr himself or by Haughton.

Fairly quickly the two of them developed a series of public conferences dealing, for example, with issues such as the newly enacted Taft-Hartley Act. Chairs of such programs included both Governor Warren and President Sproul. Among the speakers were notables such as Senators Hubert Humphries, and Wayne Morse, General Motors President Charles Wilson Auto Workers President Walter Reuther, AFL President William Green, and Professor Sumner Slichter, then perhaps the country’s most prominent industrial relations guru. Many of these conferences were held in San Francisco hotels or Harmon Gym on campus. Several two- or three-day programs took place in elegant quarters at the Awahne in Yosemite. Some local sessions drew over a thousand attendees.

From the beginning it was realized that large scale programs involving both union and management were not enough. Each side had special needs. And so a series of specialized programs were developed, on topics such as grievance handling for unions and wage and salary administration for management. Most of the management programs were jointly sponsored by University Extension (as were the labor ones technically). Many were organized or taught by Berkeley faculty. Prof. Garbarino recalls, for example, representing the Institute in organizing an annual East Bay Management Conference sponsored jointly with the Oakland Chamber of Commerce and the United Employers Associations. In addition he taught a variety of union courses, a series of

lectures on labor history for an Oil Workers local in Rodeo and a similar series for a Teachers' local in Richmond as well as (along with two colleagues, Arthur Ross and Van Dusen Kennedy) being "corralled into teaching a credit version of B.A. 150 [the basic IR course] in Salinas to guards from Soledad prison for which we each made two trips to handle all-day sessions on six successive Saturdays."¹²

Attacks from both sides

Kerr thought it critical that the Institute be seen as neutral between management and labor. Given the times this was difficult. To preserve the appearance of neutrality Kerr at first insisted that no staff member be identified with one side. During the locally famous Oakland general strike Provost Monroe Deutch asked Kerr to help settle it. Kerr declined, arguing that the University shouldn't be involved.¹³

To preserve the appearance of neutrality Kerr at first insisted that no staff member be identified with one side. "I was concerned that the programs [be] more or less balanced. I did not want the labor side to become anti-employer and the employer side to be anti-labor." Eventually to strengthen community ties Kerr dropped this staff-neutrality requirement and began hiring as "community representatives" practitioners identified with one side or the other, for the most part on a part time basis. These included, for example, Teamster Business Agent (and later U.S. Congressman) Jeffrey Cohelan and Robert Grunsky, Director of the California Metal Trades Association, then a major employers' association

Perhaps inevitably, despite these efforts, Kerr and the Institute were attacked by both labor and management. Labor left-wingers suspected Kerr of being pro-management. After all his teaching appointment was in the Business School (as was that of many other Institute faculty members). Ipso factor he must be pro-management. Later some in labor objected to Institute ever offering programs for management. At least, they insisted, programs for management should include some labor speakers.

Kerr, himself, was no red-baiter but he had some unpleasant experiences with Communists while at the University of Washington, and he tried to keep his distance from them. Nevertheless he was charged with being a Communist. (As we now know, J. Edgar Hoover suspected Kerr and indeed later tried hard to get him fired as University President.) Thus Kerr was quite upset when, without consulting him, President Sproul appointed an Advisory Committee which included some well-known Communists. On the other hand, he got along with more conservative labor leaders, especially the local leaders of the AFL. (This was a time when the AFL and the CIO still were separate and rather antagonistic organizations.)

Kerr was suspect by some more conservative managers in part because as a graduate student in the 1930s he had studied the condition of California agricultural workers and

also because he had hired Lloyd Fisher, a former Longshoremen's (a left-wing union) Research Director as Associate Director of the Institute.

Early in his term as Director Kerr was hauled before the Regents and questioned sharply, particularly by one Regent representing agricultural interests. "They were concerned that I might do a Grapes of Wrath" he said. On another occasion a group of San Francisco employers insisted the Institute shouldn't run courses for unions. And that if it didn't stop this they would boycott Kerr as an arbitrator. "They threatened me a bit ... wanted to bluff me out ... I said I would think about it."¹⁴

The balance between research and community relations

What should be the relationship between research and community relations? And what sort of research should the Institute do? These were much debated issue during the Institute's early days and the subject of a variety of committee reports.

As might be expected, community relations staff argued that community relations and research should receive equal attention and further the two should have equal weight in determining academic faculty promotions. Kerr's own position was that research came first. Given the nature of Berkeley as a University, he said, that was the way it would have to be.

But what kind of research and who would do it? It was already established that academic faculty would teach some non-credit courses for the labor-management community. Should community relations staff engage in research? Some argued they should. A professional staff should have "equal responsibilities for research and off-campus activities". Despite these arguments substantial formal published research by non-academic staff had to wait till the formation of the Institute for Labor and Employment within the Institute in the 2000s (as described later on)..

Should research be confined to labor-management relations or should it be broader? Jeffrey Cohelan, then a part-time staff member, argued that research emphasis should be on industrial relations in the community. A memo prepared by the community relations staff concluded that if a request were made for the Institute to provide services which are not "bargainable between labor and management", the Institute should try to get another department to handle it. Prof. Vaden Fuller suggested that research should be guided by "the demands of labor and management." Kerr's position was that the Institute couldn't afford to do this. Instead, (1) research should be undertaken for academic reasons; but (2) there was an obligation to translate this into popular form where possible. The Faculty Advisory Committee concluded "research topics should be of long-term as well as current significance" and "The source material should be primarily regional but the subjects should be of more general interest."

Probably consistent with Warren's original expectation as well as the Advisory Committee's recommendations, much of the Institute's original research was locally oriented. A series of studies of individual industries was published with the title of the "West Coast Collective Bargaining Series." Other studies looked at, for example, job evaluation in the Southern California aircraft industry and multiple-employer bargaining in the West Coast paper and pulp industry.

Not all of the early research was locally focused. It was during this period that through a series of academic publications Kerr and Ross made their major contributions to what was sometimes called the "California School" or "neoclassical revisionist" approach to industrial relations. In this work Kerr, in particular, tried to bridge the two major economics camps, at the time, the neo-classical and the institutionalist and to combine the best of both. Many of these studies were foundation financed. It was research during this period which made Berkeley arguably the world's respected research center.

The Ross Years

With Kerr's promotion to Chancellor and eventually to President, Grether (still Dean of the Business School) became Acting Director. Arthur Ross succeeded him. Under Ross, foundation money poured in (for example a large Ford Foundation funded study of unemployment which involved most of the Institute faculty as well as scholars from other universities). A new journal was founded, *Industrial Relations*, which was to be devoted to "all aspects of the employment relationship." Meanwhile the research itself began to have less direct practical application. Studies involving companies and unions as research sites became less common and less was primarily regional. As a consequence the faculty-community relations link weakened. Responsibility for community relations programs devolved increasingly on two Community Relations Coordinators, one for management, the other for labor (and in 1960 both incumbents were fairly ineffectual). Research clearly took priority over community relations.

Although Bay Area management took these developments in stride (for reasons to be discussed later), labor felt badly neglected. With growing stridency, unions began to attack the Institute and especially its Director, whom, they charged, ignored their concerns. Labor's demand was that the University establish an independent labor institute which would be devoted solely to its needs. The University, labor argued, provided substantial education and research services for agriculture, business, medicine, and many other interest groups -- but hardly anything for labor. By contrast, the state universities in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota all supported major labor education programs.

As Kerr put it:

"For some reasons that I never understood the trade union movement and [some] very solid people became completely turned off on the Institute... it was really violent. I never understood the depth of their passion."¹⁵

As lobbying pressure increased in Sacramento, Kerr, now President, appointed a special committee to review the Institute. The committee's report recommended a substantial strengthening of the Institute's community activities. Shortly after the report was filed, Ross and the incumbent Labor Coordinator resigned.

The Ulman years

Appointed in 1963 Lloyd Ulman, the new Director, moved vigorously to repair the breach. With Kerr's cooperation, negotiations were opened between the Berkeley and Los Angeles IIRs, on one hand, and a labor committee, on the other. In time an agreement was reached establishing quasi-autonomous Centers for Labor Research and Education in each Institute. An implicit part of the agreement was a substantial increase in University funding for labor activities. These new Labor Centers would be financed in part through a separate budgetary account.

The number of professional labor staff at Berkeley was increased from one to three and then to four. Don Vial, then the State Federation of Labor's Research Director, was hired as the Berkeley Labor Center's Chair. The labor education program was much enlarged and upgraded.

Working together Ulman and Vial introduced a series of imaginative new programs, most of which were funded by the Ford Foundation. All were inspired in part by developments in the real world of industrial relations. Several deserve special note.

The 1960s were marked by the Civil Rights movement and numerous demonstrations, some directed against unions, which were easy targets since African-Americans were under-represented among the ranks of labor leaders. In effort to ameliorate this problem, at least in the San Francisco area, the Institute organized the Minority Trade Union Leadership Program. Funded by Ford Foundation, this program involved an on-campus full-time training program for about 15 carefully selected rank-and-file minority-group union activists who took leave from their regular jobs and while on leave were reimbursed by the Ford Foundation for their lost income. The purpose, of course, was to equip these rank-and-file with the knowledge and skill required to be union officers or staff people.¹⁶ Classes were taught by regular labor education staff or by hired experts and the syllabi were designed to meet the special needs of this particular group of students. A typical day's classes might include economics, arbitration, labor history and labor law in the morning and writing and public speaking in the afternoon.

The program was successful in that most of the graduates eventually found full-time jobs either with unions or the government, but the program was expensive. The Foundation funded a second program. There was no third session, however many of the syllabi developed by the Institute were adopted by new Labor Studies programs organized at Laney College, Oakland and community colleges in San Jose and San Francisco as well

as San Francisco State. Later a similar, less intensive evening program just for women was organized by Dr. Betty Schneider of the Institute staff.

A somewhat related and very innovative Ford-Foundation funded program involved sending groups of Bay Area workers to Europe to work on jobs equivalent to their own at home. . Thus a group of about eight longshoremen were sent to the Netherlands to work on the Rotterdam docks. A similar group of nurses went to London and third group, this time of seamen, shipped on a Norwegian ship. Each group was accompanied by an observer whose job it was to observe, interview, and record the reactions of Bay Area workers to some very different ways of organizing work overseas. Eventually descriptions of each group's experiences were published.¹⁷

Another industrial relations development led to a different kind of program. Through the 1960s and 1970s the Legislature passed a series of laws gradually extending collective bargaining rights to practically all California state and local government employees, including teachers. A problem was that neither side, labor nor management (and particularly management), was prepared for collective bargaining. Stepping into the breach the Berkeley and Los Angeles Institutes began offering courses and conferences on how to bargain as well as on the legal rights of the parties. In time this led to a practitioner-directed publication, *California Public Employee Relations*, which now comes out six times yearly. CPER includes news stories of labor relations developments at all levels, state, municipal, school-district, and university, analyses of relevant recent legal decisions, as well as articles by practitioners.

Amid growing concern over the impact of industrial practices on worker health, Congress in 1973 passed the Occupational Health and Safety Act. Responding to the same need the Institute established its own Labor Occupational Health Program (LOHP), offering classes and advice to unions seeking to resolve occupational health problems affecting their own members. In time this program received federal funding. While once such funding became available other universities established labor occupational health programs of their own, Berkeley's was one of the first to be established and among the few to survive cutbacks in federal funding. Currently LOHP is in the School of Public Health.

Management programs

While the Labor Center thrived during this period, the management program atrophied. The explanation is simple: the competition was too great. University Extension offered after-work basic level business-oriented courses. Meanwhile the Business School launched an Executive Education program for mid-level managers. The typical Executive Education course involved several days of full-time work on campus. Finally the number of management consultants rapidly increased and many of these advertised themselves as equipped to offer training and advice to meet the special needs of a given clients.

At one time it was expected that the income from management courses would pay the management coordinator's salary and leave enough "profit" to pay for other activities: the Robin Hood principle: the rich would pay for the poor. But it didn't work out that way. By the 1980s few of the small number of management programs offered earned enough to even pay their own expenses, leaving little to pay for staff salaries. By 1987 when the incumbent Management Coordinator retired, he was not replaced. Probably the Management Program should have been eliminated much earlier. It was kept on primarily to preserve the Institute's image of neutrality.

Did that mean the end of management programs? Not entirely. Back around 1960 Professor Mason Haire, a psychologist, sponsored a series of roughly monthly dinners for top managers held at a top restaurant. Following the then-popular Great Books format, participants were assigned a popular business book -- or least several controversial articles -- which participants were expected to read and then discuss after the meal. A considerable success at first, the program gradually lost attendance and was finally dropped. Prof. Raymond Miles (later Business School Dean) revived this format in the 1970s, this time with speakers. Again it was successful at first and then lost membership. Finally it was revived once more in the late 1990s, with Miles again and Richard Clark, PG&E's retired CEO, taking the lead and the Haas School providing co-sponsorship. This program permitted companies to send a delegation to periodic day- or morning-long discussions on current developments in the human resources field, often including faculty members' presentation of the results of their own research. A major purpose of this program was not just to raise money. It was to provide leads and contacts for faculty and graduate student research. In this it was successful. Unfortunately some of the participating companies, such as the Bank of America, were bought out by outside firms, their headquarters moved from San Francisco, and some of the key participants became jobless. End of program.

In another effort to find a management-oriented niche not occupied by competitors Prof. Sheldon Zedeck, a psychologist, organized a series of programs on fairly technical subjects, such as, assessment centers, which brought to Berkeley some of the country's major experts on the subjects in question. The program did well at first but then may have run out of cutting-edge technical issues of interest to local practitioners.

In short, labor had a need for Institute programs. Management did not.

Later Developments

Space permits only a quick sketch of later developments. The contributions of post-Ulman directors – Ray Miles, George Strauss, Sheldon Zedeck, Clair Brown, Jim Lincoln, Margaret Weir, and Michael Reich – must be largely ignored as well as the problems they faced.

Tight University budgets lead to cutbacks in campus support, making the Institute more and more dependent on outside grants. Getting these was never easy. Successive directors gave priority to protecting graduate students and cut state supported staff. The Labor Center was particularly affected. At one point its staff dropped to one professional coordinator and a secretary. Earlier LOHP's federal grant was unexpectedly not renewed, leading to most of its staff being laid off.

Turning to the larger words, beginning as early as 1960 academic interest in industrial relations began to decline nation-wide. Strikes were fewer, Union membership was in decline. Labor-management relations somehow stabilized. Other problems, such as civil rights, the Viet Nam war, poverty programs and free speech on campus, attracted the headlines and engaged the interests of socially progressive students and faculty. This was particularly true at Berkeley.

Enrollment in industrial relations classes began to fall off, especially those related to union-management relations. (Sometime in the mid-1980's I taught the campus's last class in "Collective Bargaining". My enrollment was twelve, many of whom may have taken the class solely because of its convenient 9:30-11 hour). As faculty with a major interest in union-management relations left Berkeley or retired (Walter Galenson, Joe Garbarino, Van Dusen Kennedy, Marty Lipsett, Arthur Ross, George Strauss, Harold Wilensky and Lloyd Ulman) they were not replaced by people with similar interest¹⁸. Meanwhile critics charged that Industrial Relations dealt "the agenda of the 1940s". The University's resources, it was claimed, might better be spent on more contemporary problems

While to the outside world Industrial Relations might still mean union-management relations, the interests of younger Institute faculty increasingly focused on much broader topics, for example, the organizational structure of semi-conductor firms. The field increasingly enveloped indeed the "entire world of work". As interests became more diverse, the Institute increasingly morphed into a collection of semi-autonomous "Centers." "Research Centers", such as the Center for Organizational Theory and the Center for Work, Technology and Society, were populated largely by faculty and graduate students. By contrast "Community Outreach Centers, such the Labor Project for Working Families" consisted primarily of non-faculty union-oriented staff.. Most of these centers were funded by outside agencies and if their grants dried up the centers disappeared.

Meanwhile the Institute lost its monopoly over Industrial Relations, as broadly defined. A quite distinguished group of labor economists developed around the Economics Department in Evans Hall and these had only weak relationships with the Institute. Why? There are a variety of explanations. Perhaps most important was a long-run shift in economics, especially labor economics, towards theory, quantitative analysis, and even laboratory studies of individual economic decision-making and away from the Institute's specialty, the study of institutions, such as unions and management.

Geography also played a part. As mentioned earlier the Institute was originally located at the center of campus in California Hall and close to South Hall, which then served as headquarters for the Economics, Sociology, Political Science and Business departments, and it was not far from Psychology. During this immediate post-war period the campus was desperately short of faculty office space; many faculty members had to double or triple up. But the new Institute had some space available which was quickly grabbed. So, as Kerr commented, “we did have people from a whole lot of departments that really lived more at the Institute than they did in their departments—maybe considered it their primary office.” Although these early Institute faculty came from different traditional disciplines, they shared similar interests and considerable cross-fertilizing schmoozing occurred.

In the mid-1960s the Chancellor’s office took over California Hall, forcing the Institute to move two blocks off campus to Epworth Hall, on Channing Way. Meanwhile many of the social science departments went to Barrows – still not too far from Channing. But later Economics moved to Evans Hall and Business to Piedmont Avenue, both fifteen minutes walk from Channing. Few people made the walk. Nevertheless at first the Institute reserved a whole floor of offices for faculty and graduate students. But as time went by these received less and less faculty or student use. In time the space went to the community-focused Centers, especially the Labor Center.

Conflict Reignites

In 2000 as a result of much labor lobbying (a story in itself in which Kerr, then about 90, played an important part) the Legislature appropriated \$6 million for what became called the Institute for Labor and Employment (ILE) This was essentially a grant-making body for labor-oriented activities organized by the Berkeley and Los Angeles Labor Centers and for faculty and graduate student research on other campuses and elsewhere. In 2001, 2002 and (?) this appropriation was renewed though with some cuts each time, largely because of overall budgetary stringency. Meanwhile the program became the target of an escalating campaign of opposition from conservative business groups, especially the non-union Associated Building and Contractors. ILE was charged with being “anti-capitalist.” “Unions are private organizations,” it was charged “so why are taxpayers required to cough up money for union propaganda?” California was not alone. There were similar campaigns in other states against university sponsored union-sympathetic programs¹⁹

Governor Gray Davis, a Democrat, was recalled in fall 2003 and replaced by Arnold Schwarzenegger, a Republican. Among the new Governor’s first steps was to eliminate ILE’s appropriation.. When the 2004 Legislature renewed ILE’s funding, the Governor item vetoed it, as he did in 2005 and 2006 (???). By 2007 the Democrats were considerably stronger. Still the Governor’s proposed budget left out ILE. Labor lobbied hard for the program and the budget as passed by Legislature provided for its full

restoration. Several months went by as the two-sides deadlocked. Finally two Republicans changed their minds. In the final budget, ILE's¹⁹ original \$6 million appropriation was restored.

Name changes

In the process there were some name changes. The title "Industrial Relations" had fallen into disrepute almost world wide. The term, it was charged, had become too identified with manufacturing and union-management relations. It "smelled of smoke stacks" and dealt with the "agenda of the 1940s." So one by one academic industrial relations institutes and departments adopted newer titles suggesting broader jurisdictions (often "Human Resources"). This happened at MIT and Illinois, for instance, and even at the University of Sydney, Australia. After a considerable internal battle the field's U.S. academic society, the Industrial Relations Research Association renamed itself the Labor and Employment Research Association. Following this trend in 2007 the Berkeley and Los Angeles Institutes of Industrial Relations both became Institutes for Research on Labor Employment. Left ambiguous was whether "Labor" meant the labor factor generally or just unions.

Somewhat surprisingly the Regents (a majority of whom were probably Republicans) renamed ILE's successor the "Miguel Contreras Labor Program". (Contreras had been a Los Angeles labor leader.) In this way the Institute's service to the labor movement was legitimated.

So the Institute survives and even thrives, but it performs a different function than Kerr or Warren had originally intended. It is no longer a bridge between labor and management.

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1 Solomon Blum, *Labor Economics* (New York: Henry Holt, 1925)

2 Edwin Witte, "The University and Labor Education," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 1 (October 19437), 7.

3 Clark Kerr, transcript of interview conducted by George Strauss August 5, 1985, available in Institute for Research on Labor and Employment Library.

4 Grether's oral history describes at some length the negotiations involving himself, Sproul, Provost Clarence Dystra among others, which lead to the Institute's founding. E. T. Grether (1993) Oral history transcript. Leader in Campus Administration, Public Service, and Marketing Studies, and Foremost a Teacher. Bancroft Library. MANC Ms 94/85

5 Under the University of California system Schools and Departments teach credit courses. Institutes do not.

6 Assembly Bill 391 (1945) .

6 "Initial report of the Berkeley Committee to advise the President with reference to the establishment of an Institute of Labor [sic] and Industrial Relations pursuant to Assembly Bill 391 as amended." unsigned and undated. The original of this report, along with all the other early Institute internal documents, was destroyed when the Institute's basement was flooded in the 1980s.

7 Even before the Legislature authorized the Institute, in a May 29, 1945 memo, Grether had recommended that Kerr be Director.

8 According to Kerr he had some doubts as to whether he should accept the Berkeley offer. Washington had already promoted him to full professorship and all Berkeley offered was associate professorship. Nevertheless his wife badly wanted to return to California and her wishes carried the day.

9 Personal communication, November 21, 2004.

10 Garbarino, personal communication.

11 Kerr said later, "It was one of those things that through misunderstanding [sic] and everything just blew up bigger that deserved to be I wasn't sure any rational human being from the outside could do very much good. And there were some extremely experienced people on both sides who didn't need any help." Later, when he was Chancellor there was a transit strike. This time Kerr did work behind the scenes to settle it, but justified this (at least to himself) on the grounds that the strike prevented students from getting to class.

12 Not everyone in the labor movement was enthusiastic about this program. One prominent local leader asked the Ford Foundation angel responsible for administering the grant, "How many people are you going to train to run against me next I run for office?", to which the angel responded, "How many do you have?"

13 Among these were Walter Galenson, Joseph Garbarino, Van Dusen Kennedy, S.M. Lipsett, Arthur Ross, George Strauss, Harold Wilensky and Lloyd Ulman, a majority of whom served as labor arbitrators. None of their successors were.

14 David Bacon. "Class Warfare," *The Nation*. 12 January 2004.

15 By this time it had been renamed the UC Labor and Education Research Fund.