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**The Authoritarian Foundations of Civic Culture: Spain and Italy in Comparative  
Perspective\***

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## Abstract

What is the connection between civic autonomy and political participation? This paper assesses three answers to this question: the left Tocquevillian argument suggesting that civic autonomy encourages political participation, the right Tocquevillian argument suggesting that civic autonomy discourages political participation, and the neo-Marxist synthesis of these two positions developed by Gramsci. We investigate these competing arguments by analyzing the impact of two very different authoritarian regimes (Fascist Italy, and Francoist Spain) on post-authoritarian democratic participation. The Italian fascist regime eliminated civic autonomy, incorporating civic organizations into the party. The Franco regime, in contrast left a relatively autonomous "civic sphere" in tact. We find that Italian fascism tended to promote political participation by establishing a pattern of political behavior in which parties dominated civic associations. Spanish authoritarianism, with its more *laissez faire* orientation to civil society, left a legacy of deep political apathy. Paradoxically, from the perspective of the Tocquevillian left, the Fascist Italian regime produced a more 'participatory' liberal democracy, than the less Fascist Franco dictatorship.

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## § 1 - Introduction

What is the connection between civic autonomy and political participation? This is a key question of democratic theory and political sociology. Left-Tocquevillians (Putnam 2000: 31-64; Wuthnow 1991: 288) suggest that civic autonomy has a positive effect on political participation. For thinkers in this tradition an autonomous sphere of associations is the basis of participatory democracy. Right Tocquevillians (Almond and Verba 1963: 32; Huntington 1968: 83) argue the opposite: autonomy is important because of its restraining influence on political participation. By establishing a pre-political consensus, civic autonomy acts to protect liberal democratic states from the threat of over-politicization. The Marxist view, most developed by Gramsci, can be read as a synthesis of the left Tocquevillian critique of representative democracy with the right Tocquevillian analysis of the role of civic autonomy in restraining political participation. Neo-Marxists argue that participatory democracy can best be achieved by eroding the distinction between the "civic sphere" and politics through the construction of a mass party organization that links the two (Gramsci 1971:265).

To investigate these arguments, we develop and implement a comparative and historical method for examining the relationship between "civic autonomy" and political participation. The method uses transitions from different types of authoritarian regime as a strategic research site to investigate the connection between civic autonomy and political participation. More specifically, we use the cases of Spain and Italy, two countries that produced very different types of authoritarian regime. The Italian fascist regime, we argue eroded the distinction between the "civic sphere" and the "political sphere" thus undermining civic autonomy. In Italy the National Fascist Party (PNF) attempted to colonize associations, drawing a range of organizations into its ambit. Further it put considerable political pressure on the Catholic

Church, forcing this organization into the political sphere. In contrast the Franco regime, did much less to abolish this distinction. In Spain the *Falange* and then *Movimiento* fused with state organs at both the local and national level. In particular, the Spanish regime left large areas of autonomy for the church. We ask, "What were the consequences of these different policies toward the civic sphere for levels of national level political participation in the post-authoritarian period?"

We argue that in Italy the fascist strategy of expansion had two consequences. First it established an organizational model of a mass membership party that directly influenced both of the main post-war parties: *Democrazia cristiana* (DC) and the *Partito comunista italiano* (PCI). Second, the fascist regime forced the Catholic Church into the political sphere by encroaching on Catholic control over youth organizations. These two factors combined to produce a highly politically mobilized democracy. The model of the mass membership party, which emerged in this period, became a key feature of post-war Italian democracy, and, we suggest, was the key institution of political mobilization on both the right and the left (Scoppola 1997: 103). The Falange had no such effect on Spanish political culture. As a result the parties that developed in the Spanish case were primarily electoral organizations, similar to the Anglo-Saxon model. This led, we argue, to lower rates of political participation compared to Italy (Linz and Montero 1999: 14). The paper concludes by reflecting on the paradox that fascist regimes may have produced more participatory democracies than their more mild authoritarian counter-parts precisely because of their totalitarian features. More broadly, the paper attempts to place fascist regimes in the context of other kinds of authoritarianism, and to locate such regimes in the historical process of democratization.

## § 2 – Civic Autonomy and Political Participation: Three Views

As we suggested above, three theoretical positions speak to the connection between civic autonomy and political participation: the left-Tocquevillian position, the right-Tocquevillian and the neo-Marxist position associated with Gramsci. This section provides a brief intellectual history, and elaboration of these positions, and develops their empirical implications. To order the discussion we first present each position's evaluation of political participation, then the analysis of "civic autonomy" and finally the empirical implication of the theory. Tocqueville's legacy to the social sciences is highly ambiguous. He can be read either as a theorist of participatory democracy, or as a conservative reactionary concerned with managing the democratic revolution (Gannett 2003; Tocqueville 1988: 183, 552; Wolin 2001: 212-215). We would argue that this ambivalence has led to two very different strands of Tocqueville scholarship: a left wing strand, which became in the 1980s, and a right wing strand that was dominant in the 1960s.

### The Left Tocquevillian View

A large body of literature, beginning with Habermas's *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* ([1962] 1986) attempted to recover the eighteenth century notion of "civil society" understood as a realm of institutions between the state and the market. Worried by the increasing bureaucratization of social movements in Western Europe and the United States, and the exhaustion of the political model of state socialism, thinkers in this tradition argued that building civil society would constitute a viable non-authoritarian political project for the left. Arato and Cohen (1992: 15-16) referred to this as a "self-limiting utopia." Central to this left Tocquevillian idea was an attempt to critique formal representative democracy from the standpoint of political participation. Thus left Tocquevillians hold that *political participation*

itself is a key democratic ideal apart from constitutional norms and party alternation. One of the ways democracies should be judged is the extent to which people enter the public sphere.

Although there are many differences among scholars in this broad camp, mostly concerning the relative weight of Marx, Hegel and Tocqueville in their formulations, one of their main shared claims is that what could be called "civic autonomy", defined as a structure of formally non-political voluntary organizations outside the realm of markets and politics, sustains the formation of a public opinion that constitutes the basis for political participation. As classically articulated by Habermas an autonomous civic sphere forms the "social structural" basis for the public sphere (Cohen and Araton 1992: ix). Civic autonomy allows the development of open-ended communication about norms within institutions (salons, associations, and social movements) that are relatively unconstrained by the strategic imperatives of power and markets. If politics and markets invade civil society its public sphere sustaining functions are undermined. Habermas identified three basic threats. First the increasing interpenetration of state and economy from the late nineteenth century leads to a fusion of political and economic interests (Habermas 1986: 142-3). As Habermas points out, the de-politicization of the economy under classical liberal conditions was the precondition for the formation of a public sphere oriented to mutual understanding. Second, the bourgeois household that had once possessed an important culture debating function, withered into an intimate sphere of domesticity. Third the rise of the culture industry undermined the critical function of public debate over cultural products. In the face of these threats Habermas proposes a political project aimed at protecting civic autonomy against this triple threat (Anderson 2005: 115-116).

Habermas's general idea, that civil society is the key institution sustaining modern democracy, has been widely taken up even by thinkers who would seem somewhat distant from the Habermasian intellectual milieu. For example Robert Putnam uses political participation as an indicator of "social capital", a social scientific updating of Tocqueville's concept of association (Putnam 2000: 31-47; see Somers 2005: 259 for a useful genealogy). Implicitly this suggests that for Putnam as well civic autonomy is a social structure that sustains political engagement.

The central idea of the Tocquevillian left then is that civic autonomy, precisely because it allows for the formation of public opinion outside the manipulative contexts of markets and power can promote an interest in public affairs and a capacity to act in the public. As the art of association spreads, private people "...come together as a public (Habermas 1989: 27)." In the context of a strong associational sphere, private persons, in Benjamin Barber's (1996: 279) words, are "empowered." Associations promote political participation through a process of democratic pedagogy. People learn how to participate in non-political voluntary organizations, and they then transfer these skills to public life. If the boundaries between the civic sphere and politics erode, the process of democratic pedagogy breaks down.

Left-Tocquevillian arguments then are based on the idea that a debate oriented to mutual understanding should take place "prior" to entry into the political sphere. An open-ended debate oriented to mutual understanding among members whose social, political and cultural differences are provisionally suspended is the condition for participatory democratic politics. The left Tocquevillian argument implies that a destruction of the boundaries separating "civil society" from power and money, should have negative consequences for democratic life. Since fascist regimes are among the most radical examples of such erosion, it



is reasonable to expect that for the Tocquevillian left post-fascist democracies should suffer from political apathy and specifically it would seem quite reasonable to expect low turn out at the polls.

### The Tocquevillian Right

One of the dominant assumptions of the Tocquevillian left is that political participation as such is a value. The Tocquevillian right questions this view, arguing that political apathy can be an indicator of developed civic autonomy, which promotes a sense of community beyond political differences. Thus Tocqueville's conservative followers in the sixties, unlike his left of center followers in the eighties, were concerned primarily not with political disengagement, but managing what they called the "participation explosion (Almond and Verba 1963: 4; see also Huntington 1968: 36)." Almond and Verba systematically developed this position in their classic book *The Civic Culture*. They defined the civic culture as a mixed political culture in which, "The non-participant, more traditional political orientations tend to limit the individual's commitment to politics and to make that commitment milder (Almond and Verba 1963: 32)." Thus while left-Tocquevillians worry about "under-participation" this older scholarship of right-Tocquevillians worried primarily about "over-participation." This entirely different set of substantive concerns underpins a very different theory of the relationship between civic autonomy and participation than the left Tocquevillian one.

Drawing on Tocqueville's claim that civil associations "...far from directing public attention to public affairs, serve to turn men's minds away therefrom, and getting them more and more occupied with projects for which public tranquility is essential, discourage thoughts of revolution (Tocqueville 1988: 523)" right Tocquevillians emphasized the integrating function of civic autonomy, rather than its mobilizing function. For the right Tocquevillians it

is crucial to maintain the division between political associations and civic associations, because civic associations produce a broad consensus that sets limits to the kinds of questions that will enter the political sphere. From this perspective it is quite reasonable to expect a more autonomous civic sphere, to be associated with lower levels of political participation precisely because of the consensus building function of the civic sphere. If this is true we should expect fascist regimes, precisely because of their destruction of the barriers separating the civic sphere from the political sphere, to have produced highly mobilized political democracies.

### The Neo-Marxist View

Antonio Gramsci has been called "the Tocqueville of the left", but this underemphasizes his deep appreciation for right wing thought. It is more conceptually accurate to see Gramsci as a synthesis of the values of the Tocquevillian left, and the analysis of the Tocquevillian right. Gramsci, like all of the Tocquevillians saw an autonomous civic sphere as the basis of a stable liberal order. But his reasoning is much closer to the Tocquevillian right than the Tocquevillian left. Civil society, for Gramsci, was a realm of hegemony creating a consensus that constituted an "earthworks" around the fortress of the liberal state, much as the "parochial culture" of Almond and Verba acts as a counterweight to "participant" culture. But despite his analytic closeness to these thinkers, his political commitments were opposite. He aimed at a radical expansion and deepening of political participation. How could this expansion be carried out? His life-long political project was aimed at destroying the boundary between civil society and politics, which meant for him constructing an institution (the mass party or "Modern Prince") that would directly link the associational sphere with the political sphere to create a new form of political agency. He suggested that civic associations had to be

politicized, linked to a party organization, in order to overcome their enervating effects on radical democratic politics. Thus he wrote (Gramsci 1971: 265)

A totalitarian policy is aimed precisely: 1. at ensuring that the members of a particular party find in that party all the satisfactions that they formerly found in a multiplicity of organization, i.e. at breaking all the threads that bind these members to extraneous cultural organisms; 2. at destroying all other organizations or at incorporating them into a system of which the party is the sole regulator.

The striking piece of Gramsci's argument here is that "totalitarianism" is understood as potentially democratizing, precisely because it destroys the autonomy of the "civic sphere" and politicizes areas of life that had previously existed outside of politics. What implications can be drawn from this potent cocktail of conservative analysis and revolutionary political commitment? First, we should expect societies with a well-developed institutional separation between civil society and the political sphere to demonstrate relatively low levels of political participation. Second we should expect societies that experienced a totalitarian phase to demonstrate relatively high levels of political participation. In the following section we develop a research strategy to investigate these different positions.

### **§ 3 – The Research Strategy and Empirical Implications**

A lively literature now focuses on the relationship between political participation (or more generally democracy) and associationism. The primary research strategy of this work has been cross-national quantitative analysis using survey data. This research program however faces a difficult methodological problem. It is hard to disentangle the degree to which "democracy" (one aspect of which is political participation) causes civic associationism (or social capital), or is rather caused by "democracy." As Paxton (2002: 259) puts the point, "...although most theoretical perspectives claim causation runs from social capital to democracy the reverse could be true as well." We think that comparative and historical

methods are one potential way of dealing with this problem. More specifically, we use a historical sequence in which authoritarian regimes applied different "treatments" to the associational sphere *prior* to the emergence of democratic regimes in the post-authoritarian period. Our analytic strategy is thus loosely experimental. Since each authoritarian regime actually developed and implemented a specific policy toward civic associations it is useful to think about these as potential "causes" of political participation in the post-authoritarian period. Since the differences in civic associationism were temporally prior to the outcome of interest (patterns of democratic political participation) we can at least be sure that democratic political participation in these cases did not cause differences in civic associationism (Berk 1988: 158). Thus our strategy exploits methodologically *differences* in authoritarian regimes, to shed some light on the connection between civic associationism and political participation.

The most important difference between authoritarian Spain and Italy consists in their "regime dynamics." By regime dynamics we mean the extent to which each regime became more or less totalitarian over time. We would suggest that regime dynamics in the two cases were opposite. Fascist Italy clearly tended to be more totalitarian the longer it survived, while Francoist Spain tended to become less totalitarian. Thus these two regimes represent different treatments of the associational sphere. The Italian regime a "totalitarian treatment" and the Spanish regime an "authoritarian treatment." These distinctive types of authoritarian regime thus allow us to investigate the competing implications of the left-Tocquevillian, and right-Tocquevillian/Gramscian models of civic associationism. If the left Tocquevillians are correct, we should expect *higher* rates of political participation in post-authoritarian Spain with respect to post-authoritarian Italy. In contrast, if the right Tocquevillian and Gramscian positions are

correct we should expect higher rates of political participation in Italy. We now turn to the evidence.

#### **§ 4 - Quantitative Evidence**

We begin our analysis with a presentation of some basic quantitative evidence on national level political participation. Table one compares voter turnouts for elections to the chamber of deputies between Italy and Spain dividing the turnout by the registered population. The table divides the data between "pre-authoritarian democracies" (i.e. those before the Franco and Fascist periods) and "post-authoritarian democracies" (i.e. all those after 1976 for Spain and 1945 for Italy up to 2005). We treat each election as an independent case or instance of voter turnout. The table reveals a striking pattern. If we compare the pre-authoritarian periods in Spain and Italy the table reveals that Spain generally had a higher level of political participation (as measured by voter turnout) than Italy. In the post-authoritarian periods the data show a dramatic reversal. While in Spain voter turnout increased by five percent, with respect to the pre-authoritarian period taken as a whole, in Italy the rise was a dramatic thirty-two percent.

[Table One About Here]

The electorate in Italy and Spain in their pre-authoritarian periods was restricted by property and age (except for the window of the last two general elections in the Second Republic in Spain). In their post-authoritarian periods these restrictions were eliminated in both cases. Thus another way to read the data is that full universal suffrage appears to have had a quite different impact on voter turnout in the two cases: dramatically increasing this turnout in Italy, and increasingly it slightly, but less markedly in Spain. In Italy, then, the percentage of the registered voters who went to the polls ranged around 90 percent and this high turnout was

strikingly durable (Istituto Centrale de Statistica 2000, 1972, Ministerio dell'Interno 2002). In Spain the percentage of registered voters who went to the polls ranged from 68 to 80 percent (Ministerio de Interior 2005), and during the 1980s Spain was after Switzerland the European country with highest non-voting rate (Justel 1994, 1995; Montero 1990).

A second indicator of voter turnout shows results that do not differ substantially. Dividing the number of voters by the voting age population, the average post-authoritarian turnout to the national parliamentary elections was sixteen points larger in Italy (92% since 1946, and 91% since 1977) than in Spain (76% since 1977). In fact, using this measure, the turnouts to the Spanish elections, which peaked in 1982 with 83%, have always been lower than the minimum turnout in Italy, which dipped in 2001 to 85% (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) 2005).

There are some obvious institutional differences that might be invoked to explain the differences in national level participation. Two of these factors are particularly important: the overall electoral structure, and the specific legal environment for voting. We begin with the first. The Italian electoral system in the post-world war II period was a very pure case of proportional system, thus encouraging high voter turnout (Gallagher 1991). The Spanish system in contrast, is a mix of proportional and majoritarian electoral principles. The electoral law of 1977 established proportional representation, but also specified a set of thresholds under which parties could not achieve representation (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1986: 43-53). Montero and Linz state that Spanish electoral law has five key features: it is organized around the principle of proportional representation, results in a small parliament, guarantees two seats to all electoral districts, and applies a three percent threshold at the district level, finally it relies on closed party lists (Linz and Montero 1999: 101). These characteristics place the

Spanish electoral system in a middle ground between proportional and majoritarian regimes (Montero 1994: 72-28, Linz and Montero 1999: 101-104).

The electoral structure is however not the only difference between the two countries. There are also a series of important differences in the specific electoral laws. Article 48 of the Italian constitution stipulates voting as a "civic duty (La Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana)." Although this constitutional provision is not backed by specific legislation a 1947 law stipulated that the words "Did not Vote" would be stamped on a persons' identification papers if they failed to vote (Galli and Prandi 1970: 28). While Pombeni (1995: 115) suggests that this is not a "true obligatory vote", having these words on one's identity papers may have had negative consequences especially for state employees. A number of other factors worked in the same direction. In Italy voters were automatically registered on the voting rolls at the age of 21 and since the 1974 election at the age of 18, elections in Italy were initially a public holiday often lasting for more than one day. Further in the early post-authoritarian period a series of voluntary organizations such as the Christian Democratic "Civic Committees", and the Red Cross provided free transport to the polls (Farnetti 1985: 51; Galli and Prandi 1970:30).

In Spain this configuration of factors differs. First voting is voluntary and non-voters do not suffer any administrative sanction or any formal moral reprobation. Since the first post-authoritarian elections, voters are automatically registered at the age of 18 (which very slightly lessens the total voting turnout because young people are less prone to vote (Justel 1995: 218)). And only one of the first four national legislative elections (1986) was celebrated on a holiday while they all strictly lasted one day. Further political parties and main civil society organizations probably did not attain a major role in the direct promotion of voting through

free transportation to the polls because neither historical (Preston 1986) nor contemporary journalistic (*El País*) accounts recall mobilization efforts of any party in the 1982 or 1986 election days. So Spain seems to have lacked some of the organizational and broader institutional features that explain higher voting turnout in Italy.

Two questions arise at this point. The first question is: do the organizational and institutional factors outlined above account for all of the difference in political participation between Italy and Spain? We think there is some reason to doubt this. Elections to the European Parliament constitute a partial test of this argument. Since, unlike national elections to the chamber of deputies that are generally organized around differing electoral systems, European elections are organized around a uniform proportional electoral system, the potential intermediating effect of this institutional factor is eliminated. Regarding the European elections we only consider the ‘official’ indicator of voting turnout: the number of voters divided by the number of registered voters. In general, the evidence shows that the Italians have participated much more than the Spaniards in the European elections. The average turnout in the six European elections held so far in Italy (78%) has been twenty points larger than the average turnout in the five European elections held so far in Spain (58%). Moreover, as was the case with the national elections to the chambers of deputies, the maximum turnout in Spain (69% in 1987) was lower than the minimum turnout in Italy (71% in 1999) (European Parliament 2005).

[Table Two About Here]

A second piece of evidence also suggests that political participation in Spain and Italy differed in ways that are not related only to differences in electoral rules. Table Two presents evidence from the World Values Survey on "non-conventional" forms of political participation.



The table shows that a much higher percentage of the population signed petitions, and participated in building occupations in Italy than in Spain in all three years. With the exception of the year 1981 the same thing was true of joining a boycott, and attending lawful demonstrations. The only form of non-conventional participation that went in the opposite direction was joining a wildcat strike. But this, we would hypothesize, probably only reflects the greater power of organized labor in Italy, compared with Spain.

This evidence suggests two conclusions. First differences in voter turnout between Spain and Italy are historically recent. In the early twentieth centuries a slightly higher proportion of Spanish voters voted when compared to Italians. But this shifted sometime in first third of the twentieth century. Or to put the point differently, the effect of universal suffrage on voting turnout was dramatically different in the two cases. The second conclusion is that the differences, once established, remained substantial over time, and show up even in elections to the European parliament, and non-conventional systems of political participation, that are not sensitive to national level electoral laws. Given this patterning of voting participation it is hard to escape the conclusion that something happened in fascist period (1922-1943) in Italy that durably altered political participation, while in Spain no such sharp break occurred.

We would argue that the evidence presented above gives a warrant for investigating the connection between authoritarianism and political participation in these two "cases." But so far we have said little about mechanisms. Returning to the theoretical discussion at the beginning of our essay, we propose that the central link between authoritarianism and democratic participation lies in the connection between authoritarian parties, and non-party "civic" institutions. Following an established tradition in political science and political theory, we

would argue that fascist regimes, unlike "authoritarian" regimes, tend to link through a variety of institutional and ideological mechanisms, formally non-political organizations (such as professional organizations, unions, employers' organizations, leisure time organizations, and cultural organizations) to national level politics. This process, which we describe in more detail below, can be understood as a process of "politicization." Authoritarian regimes, in contrast, do not "politicize" their underlying populations in this way. This is because authoritarian regimes do not possess dynamic single party organizations.

### **§ 5 - Authoritarianism in Italy and Spain Contrasted**

The main differences between Italian and Spanish authoritarianism lay in their regime dynamics. Italian society in the early forties was more thoroughly penetrated by the fascist party than it had been either in the thirties, or the twenties. Thus, the regime tended to become more "totalitarian" the longer it survived. The developmental trend in Spain was *exactly* the opposite. In the early forties the Spanish regime had many fascist features. However these elements tended to weaken rather than strengthen over time. Therefore Spain of the later forties and early fifties was less fascist, than the regime of the early forties. The general reason for these differences was the difference in the power of fascist elites. In Italy, party leaders were relatively strong, and were able to pursue their interests in partial independence of the state. In Spain this was not the case.

Before developing the contrast between the dynamics of these two regimes we briefly sketch a pair of reasons for why they developed in such different ways. Two things are important: the specific way the regimes came to power, and the international context in which their rise occurred. Benito Mussolini achieved power in 1922 on the basis of a para-military and political movement (a party militia) aimed mostly at organized socialism and partly at an

emergent Catholic democratic party. For the purpose of contrasting Spanish authoritarianism and Italian Fascism, the crucial point here is that, despite the significant violence and disorder of the early twenties, Italian fascism remained a political movement engaged in a political struggle, although using paramilitary means. An actual civil war, pitting regular armies with distinct geographical bases against one another never developed. In the entire period from 1920 to 1922 no more than a couple of thousand people were killed in clashes between Fascists and Socialists and Catholics (Gentile 1993: 493). Most importantly, although the police forces were complicit in allowing the fascist squads to operate, the regular army was not involved in the conflict. This, relatively peaceful and non-military path to power meant that the fascist *party* was in a strong position after the seizure of power.

This was particularly true at the local level. Local fascist leaders built up organizations often in competition with one another. These groups used their organizations to extort money from local entrepreneurs by pursuing two basic kinds of strategies: either direct pressure, or the threat of a fascist organized strike (Lupo 2000: 202-203). In the early to mid twenties turf wars developed pitting these different groups against one another. For example in 1925 in Florence a squad led by the by a fascist named Tamburini placed the city under siege against the will of the local party secretary Dino Perrone Compagni (Lupo 2000: 204-05). As Lupo (2000: 205) writes, "...violence...represented still, aside from a style of life, a resource in intra-fascist competition." The fascist seizure of power in 1922 thus did not lead to political stability. Rather a group of local warlords controlled many local governments especially in the north and center of the country. This situation of disorder and illegality was a major threat to Mussolini's government. In his initial period of rule he aimed to reign in the squads by subordinating the party to the state. Despite Mussolini's wish to subordinate the party politically, there were

limits to how far he could go in this direction without undermining his own position. For, however unruly, the party constituted a key pillar of Mussolini's own power. The problem, as Mussolini put it, was that "...having made the revolution, the revolutionaries are still around (De Felice [1968] 1995: 184)." Thus the general direction of policy in the period from 1926 to 1932 was a process of institutional fusion between party and state. Implicit in the process was the transfer of control over civil society to party and party affiliated organizations. What emerged by the mid thirties was a dual regime, a true "party-state."

The circumstances in which the Falange became a key institutional support of Franco's nationalist state differed dramatically from the analogous process in Italy. Franco achieved victory by winning the bloodiest civil war in modern European history. In Spain, regular armies controlled identifiable geographical zones: the nationalists the south and center-north, and the republicans the center and much of the Eastern littoral. The violence of this struggle was on a much larger scale than that preceding the rise of fascism in Italy. Aside from battle field deaths proper, probably over a hundred thousand persons were executed (75,000 on the Nationalist side and 38,000 on the Republic side) during the war (Mann 2004: 342). After the war the Franco regime executed a further 23,000 people. Preston (1993: 225) even suggests that Italian fascist officers providing aid to the Nationalist side in the Spanish Civil War were shocked by the brutality of the repression. The crucial difference between the two seizures of power is that in Spain regular military men led the uprising. The Civil War developed out of a failed *pronunciamiento* or army revolt. The *F.E.-J.O.N.S.* (Falange), the Spanish version of a fascist party, was a tiny political sect until the 1936 electoral victory of the popular front. After Franco's July 1936 uprising, the Falange moved to support the general. But it could do so only

in a subordinate role. The party undertook three basic tasks behind the lines in the nationalist zone: repression, propaganda, and relief (Ellwood 1987: 34-5; Rodríguez Jiménez 2000: 246).

The subordination of the party to military exigencies, and to Franco's political ambitions, crystallized in 1937. In that year the Falangist militias were incorporated into the regular army. Further the identity of the Falange itself was muddied when it was forced to "unify" with Carlist and Traditionalist political forces who had, up until 1936, been among the Falange's bitterest enemies on the right. Franco's "unification" decree promoted the integration of the major political forces that supported the rebellion into a single party, the *Falange Española y Tradicionalista de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista* (FET-JONS). From 1937 on then it is important to distinguish both the relative weight of the Falange within FET-JONS, and the relatively weight of FET-JONS within Franco's regime.

Within the FET-JONS, the Falange seems to have been the dominant partner, at least through the end of World War II, but it was not the only player. More specifically, through the creation of a new party, the regime's leaders deliberately impeded the creation of a mass party, a decision that benefited the Old Guard of members prior to the military rebellion, and tilted the balance of power toward Franco and the military (Ellwood 1983; Payne 1999: 73, 310-1; Richmond 2003: 85). After the publication of the unification decree the major actors realized that the party would be a restricted apparatus controlled by the New Regime, which would determine the capacity and ascendancy of the state party (Thomas 2001: 43).

In addition to this inauspicious beginning, the international context quickly turned against Spanish fascism. Fascism's prestige was always highly dependent upon the international balance of power. From roughly 1930 to 1942 fascism could plausibly present itself as the regime of the future. This was dependent on two main factors: the relative success

of fascist regimes in dealing with the Great Depression, and fascist military triumphs, first in Ethiopia, then in Spain, then in Central Europe. After the defeat of the German armies at Stalingrad the appeal of the fascist model waned.

This timing is important to consider in comparing the origins of the Spanish and Italian regimes. Italian fascism emerged during the first wave of right wing mass mobilization in the twenties, and constituted a model for all subsequent fascist regimes and parties (particularly for Spanish Fascism). The Spanish regime began to organize itself during the civil war (1936-1939). Only in 1939 were the "nationalists" (the Franco side in the Civil War) in control over the entire country. Already by 1942, the war in Europe turned decisively against the Axis, and this weakened the position of the party. In 1943, when Franco decreed that the creation of a new corporative *Cortes*, the state-party was only one among a number of groups represented and thus did not even succeed in fully monopolizing interest representation in the regime (Chueca 1983: 222).

Thus, both because of the specific process by which the regimes came to power, and because of the historical period in which they rose, the Fascist party in Italy was much more powerful than the Spanish Falange. We now turn to documenting the development of the two organizations over the course of the regime. The analysis begins with a sketch of the institutional position of the authoritarian party in the two regimes at the moment of regime consolidation. We then (in the next two sub-sections) trace regime dynamics focusing on men and women.

#### *The Institutional Position of the Party During Regime Consolidation in Italy and Spain*

We begin the analysis with a description of the normalization of the fascist party in the late twenties and early thirties. Two powerful general secretaries, Roberto Farinacci (1925-

1926) and Augusto Turati (1926-1930) were the men primarily responsible for the reorganization of the party. They purged the roles, eliminated internal democracy and strengthened the central political secretariat. During the same period Mussolini used the ministerial bureaucracy to control the party from above. In a series of circulars to the prefects and government decrees Mussolini stipulated that the party federal secretary at the local level was politically subordinate to the prefect (Gentile 1995: 169). The most important of these various decrees was a 1927 circular sent to the prefects that stated, "the prefect is the highest authority of the state in the province (De Felice [1968] 1995: 302)." But the process of the subordination of the party to the state coincided with a process of "fascistization" both of the state and civil society. As the Fascist jurist Salemi put the point fascism was characterized by "a process of creations and successive transfusions into the state of organs, collateral entities, party principles and norms, that imprint the state with a fascist character (quoted in Gentile 1995: 165)." Perhaps the most visible aspect of this broader process was Mussolini's transformation of the collegial leadership body of the fascist party called the *Grande Consiglio* into a state organ.

The increasing interpenetration of state and party also went together with the increasing "fascisticization" of civil society. For a key piece of legislation in April third of 1926 turned over the entire sphere of unions and professional organizations to the PNF. After this law the only organizations allowed to engage in collective bargaining were those that the state recognized. This structure of rule produced endemic intra-regime squabbling. At the level of the central state various party leaders sought to build their organizational power against both the state and other sectors of the party. At the level of the provinces a constant struggle played out between

the party federal secretary and the prefectural authority. As Emilio Gentile (2002: 182) puts the point:

The relations between prefects and federals remained ever in a situation of precarious equilibrium that was dependent on the actual personal relations between individual prefects and federal secretaries and was never specified in any party statute.

Thus, in Italy Mussolini sought to subordinate the party organization to the central state. His efforts in this direction were only a partial success. The party and the various organizations associated with it remained a relatively autonomous power base throughout the regime. Intra-regime competition produced a tendency to expand party and para-party organizations.

Initially it seemed that Spanish authoritarianism might develop in the direction of a party-state as well. During the war and in the earliest years of the postwar period the leaders of the self-proclaimed National movement established a dual political structure with parallel governmental and party hierarchies. As in Italy, at the national, regional, provincial and local levels party bosses coexisted with representatives directly appointed by the Ministry of the Interior, and this generated considerable conflict. However, at war's end in 1939 Franco started fusing the positions of civil governor and local party leader, in a process completed by 1943 (Thomas 2001: 114). This fusion was a total victory for the ministerial bureaucracy. The Ministry of the Interior directly appointed new provincial leaders and could use the state structure to control the provincial branch of the party (Sanz Alberola 2001: 93).

Together with its subordination to the state, another defining characteristic of the Spanish state party was its exclusionary and limited character. The party leaders implemented two main deliberate strategies to constrain the expansion of the organization. One was the creation of two levels of membership that entailed very different rights and duties: militants



and adherents. In the first years of the dictatorship full membership was restricted to militants, a status reserved for those affiliated with the two main conservative forces (Falange and Carlists) before the unification as well as for those that made a special service to the New Regime. Adherents, in contrast, were generally new members who could only reach full membership after a long and demanding proof period (Payne 1999: 278). Consequently, in the earliest years, the social basis of the party was mainly formed by the Falangist and Carlist old guard, as well as those that supported the military rebellion in its more uncertain first stage.

A local study of Girona suggests that the local party cell was physically located within the town hall of the provincial civil government (Clarà 1999: 66). Regional and local office posts were left to his discretion and, although party members were preferred, there was no requirement that these posts be filled by them (Thomas 2001: 113). In imitation of the Italian regime Franco established a *Consejo Nacional* (national council) although modeled on the fascist *Grande Consiglio*, Preston (1993: 290) suggests that this institution was impotent, and that all real power a *Junta politica* (or political council) chosen by Franco made all the real decisions. This stands in rather sharp contrast to Italy where the *Grande Consiglio* maintained its collective power throughout the Fascist Regime, and was finally responsible for forcing Mussolini's resignation in 1943. Franco was able to deal with his single party more sternly than Mussolini because his primary power base lay in a combination of forces or "families" that included the military, the Church and large landowners. Thus, Franco's state did not develop as a party-state as occurred in the Italian fascist case.

The Mussolini and Franco regimes consolidated as quite different forms of authoritarianism. The most important difference, for the purposes of this essay, lay in the power of the party. In Italy the party was a key institution of the regime. It was able

successfully to bring pressure to bear both on the central state, and on the associational sphere.

In Spain the party was quite weak.

### *Regime Dynamics I: Incorporating Men*

Having established the contrasting position of the party in Italy and Spain during the period of regime consolidation, we now turn to contrasting their regime dynamics for two major sectors of the population: men and women. In the Italian case intra-regime conflict, especially between the party and the state, but also within different segments of the party organization, drove organizational proliferation. This process was also accelerated by the regime's response to the Great Depression that forced it into the business of social provision. What is particularly important about this process is that it tended to politicize the population in two different senses. First fascist organization development drove the party into areas of social life (such as the family, sporting activities, and education) that had previously been *non-political*. Further, fascism expanded in *regions*, especially in southern Italy, where all party forms had been absent prior to the March on Rome. In Spain, some of the same developments occurred. Yet there were two important differences. First, in Spain the state party incorporated a much smaller proportion of the population, and that proportion tended to decline as the regime developed. Second, Catholicism played a fundamental role in the way that the regime incorporated the population.

### Italy

The shifting and conflictual nature of intra-fascist relations, produced by the dual state, produced organizational expansion as fascist leaders sought to build up two kinds of power bases: local power rooted in the control of regions, and organizational power bases rooted in control of apparatuses like unions (Lupo 200: 210). The key point is that a tendency to attempt

politically to incorporate the mass of the population in fascist organizations was intrinsic to the structure of the fascist regime (Gentile 1995: 187).

Party elites pursued two basic strategies in their attempts to build up power: taking over pre-existing organizations initially attached to the state and creating new party organizations. For example in the late twenties there was a bitter conflict between Turati (general secretary of the party) and the Minister of Corporations over control of the after-work organizations. A similar conflict broke out in the late thirties with the ministry of education over control of the youth organizations (Gentile 1995: 182). These conflicts were material as well as political and ideological. Control over party and party affiliated organizations meant control over privileges and income. Membership numbers were important because members in fascist organizations paid dues, and dues paid salaries.

The size and geographical reach of the core male membership of the National Fascist Party (PNF), and its affiliated organizations, was without precedent in Italian history, and indeed in the history of most countries outside National Socialist Germany. As the major historian of the party puts it, "...it is necessary to start from the observation that the organizational network of the party, which extended over the entire national territory with increasing capillarity, constituted an entirely new phenomenon in the history of Italian society" (Gentile 1995: 104, see also Gentile 1989: 398; Togliatti 1976: 29-30).

[Figure One About Here]

As Figure one shows, core male membership expanded rapidly in the years from 1931 to 1936, and steadily through the thirties. By the end of the period (1942) there were almost five million male members in the PNF. We can distinguish between two basic forms of party expansion during the regime. One type of expansion colonized the pre-existing associational

terrain. This is most clearly exemplified by the history of the cooperative movement under fascism. Consumer, producer, and labor cooperatives were a distinctive feature of the Italian associational sphere in the north. Although many of these organizations had suffered violence at the hands of the fascists in the early twenties, a large cooperative movement continued to exist, and cooperatives grew under the regime. Fornasari and Zamagni (1997: 128-9) suggest that the number of cooperative societies increased forty-four percent from 7,776 in 1927 to 11,233 by 1938. This growth was accompanied by their insertion into the fascist regime. An organization called the National Syndicate of cooperative societies formed in 1921 to win over the cooperative movement to the fascists. Degl'Innocenti (1981: 51) suggests that the organizations first would purge the socialist cooperatives and then bring them into the fascist movement.

The second way that fascists established control over the associational sphere was through the direct construction of a new associational terrain. This occurred mainly in the south and on the Islands of Sicily and Sardinia. In Sardinia the federal secretary Paolo Pili "...constituted the 'Federation of social milk cooperatives of Sardinia'" (Lupo 2000:197). In Sicily the fascist party incorporated several organizations that had led land occupations in the early twenties and had been loosely associated with social Catholicism or veterans (Lupo 2000: 199). In Calabria fascism was the first political organization, apart from a few mutual aid societies, to have female sections (Cappelli 1985: 544). Further the fascist organization extended into small villages of the south where neither the socialist nor Catholic organizations were able to reach (Cappelli 1985: 543). Perhaps the Communist party secretary, Palmiro Togliatti, not one prone to exaggerate the mass basis of fascism, puts it best when he (1976: 75-6) writes:

Bear in mind that the only club that could be found before in the cities, villages and rural areas of the South was the gentlemen's club. Today there is a local [fascist] *Dopolavoro* [or after work organization] in almost every town. These organizations can be defined as compulsory, but the worker does find in them a place where he can pass the evening, where he can stay warm when the weather is cold, where he can play cards, where he can drink a glass of wine if he has money, etc. These organizations are very important, for they represent the link fascism has forged to tie the masses to itself.

Thus in Italy male membership in both party organizations and more broadly in mass organizations exploded during the regime. This development was particularly important in Southern Italy and the islands that had lacked any modern political organizations before the advent of fascism.

But this evidence does not explain what membership in the party really meant and how one became a member. These facts however are very important for understanding the basic continuity between fascism and post-fascist Italian democracy. We begin with the institution of the party card or *tessera*. The party card functioned not only as a way of declaring one's loyalty to the regime, but was also an identity card. It was the key document through which one might participate in public life in fascist Italy. By the mid 1930s the party card was required for all state employment, and in a decree of 1937 the party card was declared to be equivalent to a state issued identity card (Gentile 2002: 176). Party cards were issued by provincial level fascist organizations, called "federations." The cards were generally held in a *schedario* or file in the federation office (PNF; direttorio nazionale; servizi varie; serie ii; busta 807). Membership had to be renewed annually by paying dues that varied both across federations and across broad membership categories. For example in Milan in 1936 the budget distinguished among four categories of membership for fascists living in the city, and two categories for fascists living in the country (PNF; direttorio nazionale; servizi vary serie i; busta 832). The important point is the political membership became a fundamental condition

for the normal pursuit of "private" activities, especially finding a job, for a very broad range of occupations. As the Fascist Jurist Sergio Panunzio (1987: 208) put the point, the party "is a great school of national political education...the institution that prepares and offers suitable men to posts in the state and public institutions, without exclusions or distinctions of social rank." For Panunzio the party-card constituted the basic claim to membership in the national community (Pombeni 1995: 109).

Thus the Italian Fascist regime tended to incorporate an every greater number of men into its organizations as time went on. Further the party's reach tended to extend regionally out from the more developed north of the country to the south and the islands of Sardinia and Sicily. All of the historiography of fascist Italy agrees on the unprecedented organizational development of the PNF during the regime. We now ask, "Was there a corresponding process in Spain?"

### Spain

We begin by simply looking at the dynamics of party membership. They are rather clearly the exact opposite of the Italian case. In Italy a small core of members steadily expanded. In Spain, a relatively large group of early members withered. According to the official statistics, core male party membership in Spain grew massively up until 1939 and then remained flat or declined. Membership in the *Falange* grew from 245,000 members in 1937 to 890,000 members in 1941. Over the next twenty years membership grew from 890,000 to 931,802 members (Bardavío 1963: 177-8). Thus *Falange* membership did not expand substantially after 1941. In fact, it is very likely that after World War II membership declined abruptly (Chueca 1983: 186). The reason for this is that there are indications that the official statistics overstate the level of effective membership. As Payne (1999: 437) writes, an

unknown proportion of the almost one million declared memberships in 1963 corresponded to duplicated affiliates included in several categories. His assessment is that the level of overstatement was very intense, and he suggests that in the early 1960s the effective number of affiliates could not be higher than 172,451 people. However, the decline of the *Movimiento* was not only quantitative but also qualitative. In the Spain of the Francoist regime, there was a general impression that since the early 1940s the activity of those who were nominal members had also fallen steadily (Payne 1999: 437). The thesis of a declining nominal and active membership is supported by the scattered evidence regarding the age structure of the party members. According to Sáez Marín in 1965 85% of the party militants in the Castilian province of Ciudad Real were 45 years old or older, and in 1974 the average age of the party members in Madrid was "55 or more (1988: 474)." This evidence suggests that the party did not (or could not) incorporate into its main structures the new generations of Spaniards that were born after the Civil War or that at least were not still adults before the military rebellion.

From the end of the Civil War, the state party had relatively low levels of membership except in Navarre. Only in Pamplona (Navarre's capital) was the affiliation rate over 10%. Ten years later, in 1949, the provincial membership rates still showed a relatively uniform map of low support. And the only province that still clearly stood out from the rest was Navarre, which had an affiliation rate five times higher than the national average. For the rest of the country, the provinces of certain peripheral regions (Galicia, Catalunya, Canary Islands and Murcia) presented slightly lower rates than those in the center-north of the country (La Rioja, Aragon and Cantabria). However, these differences were generally minor in comparison with the gap between Navarre and the rest of the country. High rates of membership in Navarre, however, were actually not a sign of a strong fascist party. For Navarre was the stronghold of the

traditionalist wing of the awkward coalition of radical right wing forces that Franco had fused in 1937. Thus precisely the area that had the highest formal party membership, was probably also the least fascist.

The evidence presented above then suggests that Italy and Spain had opposite regime dynamics in relation to men. While the Italian regime's male core party membership showed a tendency to steady expansion, this did not occur in Spain. What about women? We now turn to them.

### *Regime Dynamics 2: Incorporating Women*

Both the Italian and Spanish authoritarian regimes sought to incorporate women for two main reasons. The first was to reverse the trend toward sexual liberation characteristic of the early twenties in Italy, and the early thirties in Spain. This involved a project of pushing women out of the workforce and the public sphere. But alongside this project was an effort to mobilize women politically. Thus in both cases the regime pursued a contradictory policy of both mobilizing and demobilizing women. But there were two important differences between authoritarian women's organizations in the two cases. First, and somewhat surprisingly, the women's organizations in Spain seem to have had a greater political weight than their Italian counterparts. Second, Spanish women's organizations were primarily elite organizations of Catholic education. In contrast Italian fascist women's organizations were mass organizations. These differences basically reproduced the differences that we sketched in the male organizations of the two parties sketched above.

### Italy

The effect of fascism on women has provoked a lively debate. Some suggest that fascism opened up significant opportunities for women, while others sharply contest this claim.



The debate raises difficult methodological issues since it is hard to separate the effects of social modernization from the effects of fascism *per se* (Salvati 1997: 670). One thing that all sides in the debate seem to agree on is that women's activities became the object of political interest in a way that they had not been true of the liberal period. The Italian liberal state implemented few of the paternalistic policies designed to "...safeguard wages and promote racial fitness" that other European states had enacted by the turn of the century (De Grazia 1992: 19). The fascist regime decisively broke with this *laissez faire* heritage. This was the first regime in Italian history that had policies toward the family, social insurance, and wages.

The early fascist movement, like other movements of the patriotic left in post war Italy, supported women's political rights (both their right to vote and their right to hold office), as its June 1919 party program made clear (Detragiache 1983: 368-9; De Grazia 1992: 30). But after the turn of the party to the right in 1920, fascism's position on women became steadily more conservative. In 1925 Mussolini granted some women the right to vote in local or "administrative" elections, although this right soon became meaningless because in September of 1926 the key local leadership positions such as mayor and *podestá* were made central state appointees (De Grand 1976: 954; Noether 1982: 71). After the regime began to pursue demographic policies in 1926 with the founding of the Central Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), and the Commission to Investigate Malthusianism, one of its major policy goals was to force women out of the work place and public life, and back into the home (De Grazia 1992: 48). As part of the regime's attempt to increase the birth rate Mussolini made abortion a state crime, took measures to discourage the use of contraceptives, and sought to encourage poverty and ignorance among women as a way of promoting large families (De Grazia 1992: 55). These policies were linked to attempts to push women out of the labor market by setting quotas for

various kinds of employment. The regime placed restrictions on women's participation in competitive civil service examinations (De Grand 1976: 958). The fascists also attempted to force women out of elementary and high school education, fields that were highly feminized in liberal Italy (unlike France) (Salvati 1997: 676). Thus the explicit policy of the fascist regime suggests a strategy of excluding them from the labor force and from political life.

The attempt to return women to the home was however deeply contradictory for two reasons. First the policy could only work through "...a major extension of benefits in the form of larger family allowances, direct subsidies to mothers, insurance to survivors when the major source of income died, and increased medical care including a limitation on private medical practices (De Grand 1976: 965-66)." In short fascism had to implement some type of welfare state to implement its conservative vision of the family. But bureaucracies that undertook these welfare activities were overwhelming staffed and run by women. Thus the very state bureaucracies that were designed to keep women at home became a major source of female employment. The main organization providing aid to children and families was the *Organizzazione Nazionale di Maternità ed Infanzia* (ONMI). ONMI depended on female volunteers and fascist women's groups for its administrative staff (De Grazia 1992: 61, 98). Thus fascist social policy, which aimed at returning to the home, opened a set of quasi-political careers for women outside home in the very agencies that were supposed to implement this policy.

But this was not the only tension in fascist policy toward women. For the regime demanded from women as from men participation in regime rituals and organizations (Noether 1987: 77). This tended to draw women out of the home. As De Grazia (1992: 266) writes:

To rally them called for the dictatorship to exact claims on women's time, resources, and sentiments, the effects of which ran counter to its deeply held antifeminist

impulses, as well as the conviction that women's "custody of the hearth" was indispensable to the national welfare.

Fascist leaders enrolled women in fascist mass organizations in huge numbers from the early thirties onward. Party secretary Turati was the first to recognize an official place for women's organizations among the fascist hierarchy in 1929. In 1930 the party began to subsidize a publication for women called *Giornale della donna*. Turati also organized a system for recruiting young women into the organizations by following the male party's example of recruiting waves of youth (De Grazia 1992: 248). These strategies bore fruit during the thirties. For example enrollment in women's youth organizations, and the organizations of "rural housewives" increase from just a few thousands in the 1920s to several million by 1942 (De Grazia 1992: 176, 248, 265). As in the case of the male core structure, the nineteen-thirties was the key period of expansion. The number of members of all the women's organizations (the rural housewives, the *fasci femminili* and the women's factory organization numbered over six million. What then were the consequences of fascism's policies toward women? Birth rates steadily declined throughout the regime, despite the demographic policies. Further, although the number of women employed in agriculture and industry decreased during the regime, there was "...a rise in women holding professional and white collar positions (De Grand 1976: 959)." This was probably aided by an increase in party jobs, and in jobs in the most fascist parts of the state bureaucracy.

### Spain

As in Italy the Spanish *Falange* created a women's organization, but in many respects these organizations were more dynamic and independent of the male party than their Italian counterparts. Because Pilar Primo de Rivera, the sister of the Falange's ideological lodestar José Antonio Primo de Rivera, headed the *Sección Femenina* (SF), the organization possessed

a special status within Franco regime. Given this, it is all the more remarkable that the SF, like the FET-JONS showed a tendency to shrink rather than grow over time, again in sharp contrast to its Italian counterpart.

The general objective of these institutions was to extend the social control of the party to certain social groups of particular strategic importance (Richmond 2003: 80; Thomas 2001: 136). Of these institutions, the best organized was *Sección Femenina* (SF). The SF was created during the war as a network of social welfare centers for the health and hunger relief of wounded combatants, women and children in the Nationalist zone (the part of the country controlled by Franco during the Civil War) (Payne 1999: 301). Led by the charismatic Pilar Primo de Rivera, the organization was a success, and in only two years from 1937 to 1939, its official statistics stated an expansion from 60,000 to 580,000 members (Thomas 2001: 139). Between 1938 and 1939 the SF also expanded from 1,250 to 3,000 military hospitals and laundries (Payne 1999: 257). The SF soon became the single most important structure for secular female social activism in Spanish history, and certainly the biggest organizational success of the Spanish Falangist Movement.

Although he does not provide any comparative evidence, Payne has even claimed that the SF was the only FET institution that became more developed than its Italian counterparts. According to Payne (1999: 477), this success cannot be attributed to a more perfected application of the fascist principles, “for ideologically and politically [the SF] was distinctly less fascist than either the Italian *Fasci Femminili* of the much larger National Socialist *Frauenschasft*,” but to the traditional Catholicism that permeated its structure. Historical accounts suggest that Spanish women's organizations were much more oriented to Catholicism than their Italian counterparts (Thomas 2001: 144, Richmond 2003: 54). Following the

doctrine of Jose Antonio Primo, founder of Falange, to Pilar Primo and the rest of the SF leaders, Catholicism was an unavoidable component of Spanish nationhood needed for the cultural reproduction of society (Richmond 2003: 54). But Catholic activism was also a critical strategic element that tied the SF and the rest of the Falangist Movement to the other major “families” of the regime such as the army generals and the Catholic Church (Richmond 2003: 64-5). There are many signs of the Catholic activism of the SF. During the war the SF declared Saint Therese of Jesus as her patron saint, and the monk Justo Pérez de Urbel was recognized as the SF’s religious councilor (Thomas 2001: 144). In the postwar period, the SF leaders organized several pilgrimages to Rome and Santiago of Compostela (Richmond 2003: 64), while they actively supported Mass attendance among the SF members and the rest of the female population (Richmond 2003: 63). The mobilization of the Falangist ideology, the avoidance of fascist anticlerical principles and the explicit defense of the Catholic Church and practices probably combined to consolidate the SF's influence. Waning support from the state undermined the viability of the organization by the early forties. As a result of these developments the number of members of the SF began to fall. Only four years after the Civil War, an informer of the Ministry of Interior remarked on the “‘coldness’ of participants at the Seventh Congress of the SF in January 1943, noting that they were all *Sección* officials.” (Payne 1999: 390) The scattered membership data available also indicates that after the Civil War the SF suffered a sudden drop in its membership both among the staff and the unpaid members. In between 1946 and 1951, the number of paid rural instructors on active service fell from 3,861 to 3,100 women (Richard 2003: 154) While in 1959, the organization reported having 207,021 members, barely a third of what it declared two decades before (Payne 1999: 437). Despite the general decline, during the 1950s and 1960s the SF continued being one of

the most active FET institutions. This was mostly due to the integration of the institution into the bureaucratic apparatus of the state (Richmond 2003: 126) , and the organization's securement of its relation with the younger generations through the creation of a semi-compulsory system of social services for all young unmarried women, as well as the incorporation in the curriculum of schoolgirls several subjects exclusively taught by SF leaders.

### *Ritual – Politicization versus 'Parochialization'*

In this section we use newspaper accounts of party secretaries' trips to the provinces in Spain and Italy to demonstrate the differences between these two party organizations and the types of political culture that they produced. Our main point here is that the party organization in Spain reinforced the parochialism of Spanish the political culture. That is, the political rituals of the *Falange-Movimiento* were bound up closely with religion. In this sense it is misleading even to think of Franco's state-party as a political organization at all. In the Italian case, we argue, the party organization tended to produce a *participant* political culture. The kinds of rituals that Italian fascism promoted were more clearly political than their Spanish counterparts.

Our data includes 97 trips to municipalities away from the capital province by the Falangist party secretary José Luis Arrese in his first secretariat (from 1941 to 1945) and 393 trips by Italian party secretary Achille Starace (from 1931 to 1939). The secretariats of these two figures were comparable because both presided over the 'normalization' of their party organizations. Further their activities were highly similar. Both took numerous provincial trips to preside over staged regime rituals. Comparing journalistic accounts of their trips is thus an

especially fruitful way of contrasting the types of political culture that the Spanish and Italian regimes attempted to inculcate.

The descriptive statistics from these trips show two striking differences. Fifty-six percent of Arrese's trips (54 out of 97) included some type of Catholic ritual (i.e. mass, Te Deum or blessing). Twenty-six percent (25 out of 97) included a full mass. In contrast, only two percent of Starace's trips (8 out of 393) included a mass. And only sixteen percent included a Catholic ritual (62 out of 393). This suggests that Catholicism was much more important for the *Falange* than for the PNF. The qualitative descriptions of the trips in each case bring this difference out forcefully. For example on the seventh of April 1942 Arrese took a trip to Corella (Navarre). Arriba described the festival this way:

In the morning the entire city appeared adorned with the national colors and those of the Movement. Even the most humble houses wished to make obvious...the participation of the whole people in the great Catholic festival that a happy circumstance had made coincide with the visit. At ten in the morning in the Church of San Miguel a very solemn sung mass was held, observed by all of the authorities: the local government and the party leadership.

What is remarkable about this is the way Arrese's visit is made indistinguishable from a Catholic festival. It is hard to imagine that this was an accident. Although it could be argued that the trips to the ultra-conservative Navarre represent particular cases, descriptions of trips to other provinces confirm this conclusion. For example the arrangement of the speakers on the stage at a trip to Malaga in southern Spain seems to indicate the same kind of intentional blending of party and church. The trip was to commemorate the coronation of the "Virgin of Victory". Here is the description:

The Secretary General of the party, comrade José Luis Arrese, who arrived accompanied by the authorities especially invited to the acts of the commemoration of the liberation of the city and the crowning of the patron saint, reviewed the forces how paid him honor...To the right of the altar was

seated the secretary general of the party. To his left was the papal Nuncio accompanied by the prelates who observed the ceremony.

Again there is an intentional blurring of the boundaries between what properly belongs to politics and religion. The newspaper account underlines that this is at once a Catholic and Falangist event.

A description of Starace's arrival in Padova on the eight of February 1932 dramatically underlines the difference between the two party organizations. *Il popolo d'Italia* states:

The black shirts of the city and the province lined up along the itinerary that Starace was supposed to follow, behind vessels, plaques and banners... The entire city was at once on the street festive among trumpet blasts and the roll of drums.

This festival, then, bears some resemblance to Aresse's entrance into the city of Malaga. But it was entirely laic. Twenty-four named dignitaries met Starace as he arrived in Padova. They included federal secretaries, vice federal secretaries, local government figures, and parliamentary senators and representatives to the chamber of deputies. Even the leader of the women's *fasci* was presented. Conspicuously absent from this list is any mention of priests. No Catholic dignitaries were present. This does not mean that the PNF did not use Catholic ritual. But these rituals tended to be occasional and subordinate to the party. For example a priest blessed fascist standards on a trip on the first of March 1932. But the overwhelming emphasis of fascist rituals, as documented in these trips, was political mobilization. Consider the description of a parade on the ninth of February 1932.

The standards of the federation and the members of the federal directorate, the associations of the war wounded and the invalids of the war, the standards of the provinces of the three Venices, the flags of the Comunes, held in person by their podestà [a kind of local dictator appointed from Rome], the black shirts the university militia, the fascist youth, the avanguardist groups, the balilla, the pre-militaries, the union associations and the associations of employers, the sporting and afterwork associations all passed in front of the hierarch.



This was the opposite of the parochialization of Spanish political culture. Italian fascism deliberately politicized the associational sphere.

Together with the level of integration of the preauthoritarian civic sphere into the party galaxy, the articles of this official party newspapers provide support to another central difference of the political culture in both countries: the autonomy of the party. While the Italian fascist party soon consolidated an intense autonomy from the state, the Spanish counterpart was decidedly subordinated to the public bureaucracy. If this difference is that prominent, it should be visible in the trips of the general secretaries. Correspondingly, we expect that the Italian general secretary was more prone than his Spanish counterpart to visit the local branch of the party and less likely to visit local state agencies. In fact this is particularly the case. With regards to the local branch of the party, A. Starace visited it in forty-nine percent of his stops at municipalities, while J. L. Arrese did it in only twenty-seven percent of them. And with regards of the state local agency, A. Starace visited them in only twenty-six percent of his trips, whereas J. L. Arrese did it in forty-three percent of the occasions.

This section contrasts the authoritarian regimes that developed in fascist Italy and Francoist Spain. The section makes three basic points. First institutionally the Italian regime was a dual regime. Mussolini's attempt to tame his party was only a partial success. In contrast, Franco was highly successful in subordinating the *Falange* to the state. Second, as a consequence of the rather different weight of the party and state in the two regimes, their party organizations developed in contrasting ways. The PNF tended to expand, in part because the party existed in competition with the state, and in part because different party and para-party apparatuses competed with one another. This process of intra-regime competition produced a tendency to political incorporation, because fascist "bosses" wanted as many dues paying

members as possible in their organizations. The *Falange* in contrast did not expand to the same degree. Finally the two organizations were qualitatively distinct. The *Falange-Movimiento* had to accepted the centrality of non-political religious rituals. Indeed newspapers accounts suggest that the party intentionally blurred the lines between party and church. The PNF in contrast was a properly political organization.

## **§ 6 - The Democratic Party System in Italy and Spain Contrasted**

We now briefly turn to an examination of the party systems of Spain and Italy in the post-war democratic period. Our argument here is that Spanish and Italian democratic parties differed sharply as organizations, in ways that were similar to the authoritarian period. In Italy the two main mass parties were *mobilizing* forces as much as electoral machines. This derived from the fact that the parties dominated a series of extra-political organizations such as local welfare and leisure organizations. As we will show this reproduces a pattern established in the fascist period. In Spain, in contrast, the party organizations that emerged were primarily *electoral* organizations. They did not engage in significant extra-political activity aimed at consolidating a core membership. Rather they quickly into centrist catch all organizations.

### *Two Models of Democratization*

Before beginning our analysis we briefly sketch the different historical processes of democratization in Spain and Italy. A good place to begin is to contrast how Mussolini and Franco died. Partisans shot Mussolini and his entourage and put their mutilated bodies on public display in a Milanese piazza. In contrast Franco died in his bed. This contrast summarizes the dramatically different ways that Italian fascism and Spanish authoritarianism ended. Italian fascism was removed after a quasi civil war pitting the rump fascist regime of the *Repubblica Sociale*, against a heterogeneous coalition of allied forces, communist led

partisans, and monarchists. Of particular importance to the subsequent history of Republican Italy is the role that anti-fascist resistance played as a founding "national myth." Anti-fascism was the minimum slogan that linked all of the legitimate political forces, and still plays an extraordinarily important role in Italian politics. The Franco regime, in contrast ended in a peaceful "pacted" transition including major figures of the authoritarian regime. As in the rise of the fascist regimes, the international context in which this transition took place had very important consequences for the political cultures that consolidated in the subsequent democratic regimes.

The defeat of Italian fascism coincided with a period of tremendous flux in international relations. From 1945 until at least 1948, the division of Europe between the Soviets and the allies was unclear, and Italy was emerging as a potential battleground. Although liberated by the allies, it possessed the largest communist party outside of the Eastern bloc, a party whose prestige had been enormously increased by its role in the anti-fascist resistance. The international conflict of the cold war was thus fought out "internally" in Italian politics. As Michele Salvati (2003: 43) puts the point, "...the radical ideological conflicts of the first half of the twentieth century penetrated deeply into the initial definition of the Italian political system and into the ideological universe in which the public sphere of the (re) born democracy took form." These differences in the initial transition to democracy are important for understanding the different types of democracies that took shape. This is particularly true because they tended to increase the stakes of the political conflict in Italy, and lower those stakes in Spain, thus suggesting a rather compelling reason for different levels of voter turnout. But, we would suggest, that the legacies of the authoritarian period proper were also of great importance.

## *The Legacies of Authoritarian Rule*

What then were the legacies of authoritarian rule in Italy and Spain? In this section we argue that in Italy the fascist party developed a model of political organization in which the civic sphere was party dominated. The two main parties in post-war Italy developed this model. In Spain, despite pressures both from the Communist party and within the socialist party, mass party formation did not develop, in part because the organizational model was not available.

### Italy

Italian political elites in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War debated between two models of constitutional development. One, "classical liberal model" implied a "first past the post" or majoritarian electoral system, which would reward centrist parties. But this vision was defeated, and a different model of democracy as a state of strong mass parties developed (Piretti 1995: 329-331; Scoppola 1997: 103). The two most important mass party organizations were the *Partito Comunista Italiano* (PCI) and *Democrazia Cristiana* (DC) followed by the *Partito Socialista Italiano* (PSI) that was never able fully to consolidate its position. Thus the key players in the Italian political system were the DC and the PCI.

Both the DC and the PCI were direct membership parties in which individuals belonged by purchasing a party card. As Martinelli (1995: 177) writes of the PCI "...issuing party cards [*tesseramento*] constituted the back-bone of the party." The party card was also a key institution in the PNF, as we described above. This was a very important feature of the Italian political system. Electioneering was only one, and in the case of the Communists somewhat minor, function of political parties. Indeed for the Italian Communist party increasing its membership roles was considered more important than increasing its vote. Thus unlike indirect

membership parties in which elections are virtually the only party function one of the major goals of both these organizations was to increase direct membership (Galli and Prandi 1970: 91). It is also important to stress that to the degree that the PCI and the DC were membership parties they were similar to the PNF.

The DC and PCI, like the PNF also provided key social services, such as welfare, and leisure time activities, to their members. For example the Communist party organized a program in the early forties through which recruits and war veterans were sent to spend the winter with communist families in Tuscany and the Emilia Romagna, a gift giving festival called the *Befana del soldato* taken over from the *Befana Fascista* of the fascist period, and organizations of *Casa del soldato* (soldiers' houses) which showed films and put on theatrical productions much like the fascist afterwork organizations (Martinelli 1995: 180; Ventrone 1996: 122). The DC undertook similar activities especially among returning war recruits (Ventrone 1996: 136).

The organizational base of post-war Italian Communism was Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna. These two regions of Italy had a long reformist socialist tradition, but had also been key areas of fascist mobilization in the early twenties. Pre-fascist Italian socialism was a somewhat anarchic affair. Chambers of labor, unions and workers leagues acted autonomously from one another and were only loosely affiliated to socialist federations. In the post-war period this situation changed dramatically as Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany now became the strongholds of the PCI. As Maurizio Ridolfi emphasizes, this went together with an organizational transformation. Ridolfi (1997: 355-6) writes:

While the prefascist socialist universe consisted in a galaxy of atomized circles and associations, without the territorial sections of the party being able to direct them in a unified way, the solidaristic and socio-cultural network created by the Communists was inserted into a system of social and political hierarchies at the

top of which stood the party organizations, having the function of ensuring congruity in particular instances with that of a more general social and political mobilization.

It might be thought that PCI was simply taking heritage of reformist socialism that had been strong in precisely these areas in the pre-fascist period. But the fascist experience, while in many ways rooted in this political culture, had transformed the associational sphere in a durable way. Pre-fascist socialist and communist party organizations had tended to be focused on party militants. But in the post-war period this changed. As Ventrone (1996: 123) welfare activities were not longer focused exclusively on party militants, but were extend to the "'broad masses' , that is to the entire population." This was part of the Togliattian strategy to build a new type of party aiming at constructing a broad "national" base.

But the DC and the PCI differed in terms of their social and regional bases and in terms of their organization. After Palmiro Togliatti's strategic redirection of the PCI at Salerno in 1944 (the so-called *svolta di Salerno*), the party aggressively pursued a very broad social base. Official party statistics indicate that the PCI was mostly a party of urban workers and peasants with substantial support also among artisans and white-collar workers (Tarrow 1967: 140). The party's electoral support came from a broader stratum of the population, and that support tended to broaden among younger age cohorts. Perhaps the most dramatic difference between the PCI and the DC lay in their differing regional bases. In the north of Italy the PCI and the DC were rooted in different geographical locations: the DC in the Northeast, above all in the Veneto, and the PCI, above all Emilia Romagna and Tuscany. In southern Italy this geographical polarization did not exist. As Tarrow (1967: 180) writes, "In northern Italy, as in two party-systems such as the United States and Great Britain, the vote is highly polarized geographically." In the south in contrast high DC and PCI votes existed together in the same

geographical areas. There are two remarkable features of the post-war Italian party system. One of these features suggests continuity with the pre-fascist liberal system, and a second suggests an important change. The PCI and the DC were regionally rooted in precisely those areas in which the socialist and popular parties had been strongest in the pre-fascist period. However by the fifties both parties had broken out of their local geographical strongholds in the north to gain a substantial following in the south as well. Thus there were both *national* parties, unlike their pre-fascist predecessors.

What were the consequences of these highly organized parties for political participation rates in Italy? We would argue that there were two basic consequences. First the parties decisively shaped the electoral system, and indeed the conception of democratic representation dominant in the Italian first Republic. Italy was a case of very pure proportional representation. This, as the research of Piretti has shown, was to a degree the consequence of organized mass parties in the post-war period. Second, and more directly, mass party organizations provided the organizational infrastructures through which the vote was mobilized.

### Spain

The post-authoritarian Spanish party system constituted a virtually complete contrast to Italy. Instead of two large "membership parties" with well developed on the ground structures aimed at walling off their membership from opponents, Spain consolidated as a two party system in which "catch all parties" (the socialist PSOE and the right wing AP) competed for the center of the political spectrum. In contrast the one party that came closest to the Italian model (the PCE) was rapidly marginalized, despite its leading role in the opposition to Franco. At the national level it is necessary to distinguish between two periods: that between 1977 and 1982, and that from 1982 to the present. During the first period the *Unión de Centro*

*Democrático* (UCD) headed by Adolfo Suárez an ex-Francoist official, and the socialist *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE) constituted the main political parties (Méndez Lago 2000: 58; Montero 1994: 62-63; Morlino 1998: 177). During the second period, following the collapse of the UCD, the party system stabilized into a pattern of alternation between the PSOE and *Alianza Popular* (AP) (Méndez-Lago 2000: 70). The PSOE would seem initially to have been the most promising candidate for a mass party in post-Francoist Spain. But its leadership explicitly renounced this strategy. The party's moderate leader Felipe Gonzalez suggested that the term mass party had "pejorative connotations" during a meeting of the party's Summer School in 1980 (Méndez-Lago 2000: 169). Thus, in contrast to the Italian case, the main political forces of both periods (UCD, PSOE and AP) were mainly electoralist (Cebrián 1981: 65-66) and devoted less effort than their European counterparts to the expansion of membership (Pérez-Díaz 1993: 61). As Pérez-Díaz (2003: 130) writes "...Spanish voters tend to support parties without becoming militants of them." By 1982 the party with highest (although declining) membership was the minoritarian IU with 181,000 members, while the UCD possessed 144,000 members, PSOE 107,000 and AP only 85,000 (Linz and Montero 1999: 36; Hopkin 1999: 103). Scholars suggest various factors for this comparatively low party membership such as the length of the authoritarian regime, new consumption patterns, and the emergence of mass media that enhanced the personalization of the political debate and attenuated the need of mass organizations and local activities (Linz and Montero 1999: 13). But the dynamics of the Franco regime were surely a factor as well. Precisely of the weakness of the authoritarian party this regime did not leave an organizational legacy that could be taken up by the democratic forces.



The PSOE faced different challenges than the UCD but like the center right party had low-membership. In the first electoral period the party sought to consolidate a moderate social democratic image that reinforced the leadership of F. González and A. Guerra at the same time that these leaders reduced the influence of the party base. In the second electoral period party and government rallied around F. González restricting members' participation and internal debate (Linz and Montero 1999: 21, 35). And this oligarchic trend was reinforced by the general fear of the party's dismemberment (that debunked PSOE in the Second Republic and UCD in the 1980s). Further, congressional norms of behavior that inhibit deputies' individualism and high electoral expenses that restrained competition institutionally favored oligarchy (Pérez-Díaz 1993: 62).

Similarly to Italy, the main Spanish parties also differed in their social and regional base. Rapid industrialization and sustained economic growth during the sixties and the rural exodus eroded the class cleavages that had characterized the Second Republic (1936-1939). Consequently, since the re-establishment of democracy Spanish parties in the post-authoritarian period tended to develop as catch all parties (Pérez-Díaz 1993: 51). Indeed the centripetal pattern of the Spanish parties was already visible in the 1979 election, when four major parties (including the PCE) made catch-all party appeals resulting in similar occupational profiles of the UCD and PSOE voters (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1986: 191-202). The existence of similarities should not be interpreted as total overlap, because the PSOE continued to enjoy greater working-class support and the UCD maintained the support of the middle upper classes (Maravall 1984: 213). In the latter years, the practical disappearance of UCD in 1982 enhanced the "centrist" efforts of the PSOE and AP whose social profiles

continued converging, although differences persisted, for instance, in PSOE's higher success among the working-class and less educated workers (Linz and Montero 1999: 85).

The persistence and probable decline of the social divide has nevertheless been coexistent with sharp regional divisions. Generally, the UCD and AP gained higher support in the central meseta, the on the islands and in Galicia, while the PSOE was proportionally more successful in the most populated peripheral regions such as the Basque Country, Catalonia, Valencia region and Andalusia. In these four regions and in all the legislative elections until 1987, the PSOE always obtained more votes than UCD or AP.

The party system of post-authoritarian Spain was thus much closer to the Anglo-Saxon model of catch all electoral organizations oriented to the center of the political spectrum. Italian parties differed. They tended to be direct membership organizations, which provided leisure time and cultural activities, and were as oriented to membership as elections.

### *Comparative Conclusions*

The consequences of these differences for political participation were profound. Post-authoritarian Italy and Spain stood on opposite ends of the spectrum of European countries in terms of party membership. This difference can be demonstrated in various ways. First if one simply looks at the membership of the main mass parties in the two cases they differed dramatically. The two main mass parties in Italy had well over a million members by 1960, while the third main 'mass party', the PSI had around 500,000 members. Another way of looking at this issue is the rate of membership in the mass parties. The rate is the number of party members as a percentage of the number of votes cast for a mass party. If we take the archetypal mass party (the communist party in both cases) the difference is quite striking. For the Italian communist party this rate averaged 30% in the five elections for which data is

available before 1970. For the Spanish communists this rate averaged 8% for the five elections before 1990 (Morlino 1998: 175).

Rates of party membership in the two cases did not always diverge in this way. The scattered available information seems to indicate that during the preauthoritarian regimes, the Spanish party system was stronger than the Italian one. As Galli and Prandi (1970: 90) write, summarizing a mass of literature on the subject, "Before 1922 membership in Italian political parties was rather low". Although the evidence available for Spain is not as good, the situation in Spain was probably the opposite. In February 1933, the main right-wing party (CEDA) stated having 735,058 members (Montero 1977: 290), while Azaña's center-left party Acción Republicana declared 130,000 members (Payne 1993: 168). Three years later, in June 1936, immediately before the military coup that started the Civil War, the Spanish Communist Party claimed having 100,000 members (Payne 1993: 295). But in the post-Franco and post-Fascist periods the countries diverged sharply. As Morlino (1998: 172) summarizes the evidence, "The installations of democratic regimes in these two countries differed markedly in one key element: the degree of mass mobilization which characterized the two transitions and consolidation processes." Thus, as in the case of voter turnout, there appears to be a reversal in the positions of Spain and Italy with respect to party membership with respect to their pre-authoritarian liberal periods.

## **§ 7 - Conclusions**

We have shown that the specific institutional form of authoritarianism in Spain and Italy had important consequences for the types of democratic regimes that emerged in the post-authoritarian period in both nations. In Italy a nexus of high voter turnout and high party membership emerged in its post-authoritarian democracy. This was a sharp reversal of its pre-

authoritarian pattern of political participation. Although pre-authoritarian political participation in Spain was similar, Spanish post-authoritarian democracy contrasted sharply with its Italian counterpart. In Spain voter turnout and party membership were quite low. This difference in patterns of political participation in the two cases is somewhat puzzling because of fundamental similarities between the two countries. Both were semi-peripheral capitalist societies experiencing authoritarian regimes that emerged in reaction to a period of incipient revolutionary threat. Why did they produce such strikingly different patterns of political participation in their consolidated democracies? We argue that the differences derived in part from differences in the authoritarian regimes of the two cases, and specifically in the policies of these regimes toward the civic sphere. In Italy, we suggest, the fascist party penetrated voluntary organizations, thus sharply reducing civic autonomy. The Falange in Spain did this to a much lesser degree, and its reach weakened over time. As a result political participation in post-fascist Italy was organized according to a very deeply rooted sense of political belonging (Scoppola 1997: 168-178). In Spain in contrast, politics was more fluid, and political membership less rigid. This also meant lower turnout at the polls. Our empirical argument has a further set of methodological and theoretical implications, which we develop here.

Much of the literature on civic associationism and democracy suffers, in our view, from its obsessive focus on one basic regime type: parliamentary democracy in its various forms. This presents serious methodological problems, because it remains unclear whether polity characteristics determine patterns of associationism, or whether patterns of associationism determine polity characteristics. One strategy for untangling this relationship, we suggest, is to compare the types of democratic polity that emerge from different types of authoritarian regime, especially as these regimes have varied in their policies toward civil society.

Authoritarian regimes are not all birds of a feather. One of the most important ways they differ is in their stances toward civic autonomy. This variation should allow research to exploit authoritarian regime variation methodologically in investigating the connection between civic autonomy, and more broadly, associationism and democracy, because it hangs a causal analysis on *temporal* sequence. Our paper also raises a set of more general issues about how political sociologists should think about democracy and dictatorship. One of the reasons the strategy we have developed has not been pursued before is because political scientists and political sociologists tend conceptually to isolate democracies and authoritarianisms, and to conceive of them in relation to "ideal typical" asymptotes. This paper suggests that this is not always useful. Authoritarian and democratic regimes are complex historically constructed objects, not approximations to an ideal type. Authoritarian regimes may borrow organizational forms, and conceptions of nation-hood from democratic regimes, while democratic regimes may employ strategies of mobilization taken over from authoritarian regimes. A political technique (like party organization) that serves authoritarian purposes in one context may be key to explaining extensive democratic participation in a changed historical environment. Conversely "democratic" political techniques like civic engagement can be exploited for authoritarian purposes (Riley 2005). Political sociology should put these processes of borrowing and inversion at the center of its concerns.

We have also sought to make a theoretical argument somewhat at odds with prevailing views. We suggest (following the Tocquevillian right and Gramsci) that an autonomous civic sphere tends to limit political participation, rather than promoting it. Indeed for both these thinkers this was precisely the reason that civic associations were key to the stability of liberal democratic states. The evidence we have presented seems to confirm this argument. Since the

mid-forties Italy has had considerably higher rates of political participation than Spain. And this has occurred precisely because the Italian fascists made much greater efforts than their Spanish counterparts to incorporate politically civil society. Thus, on our view, Italian Fascism connected local and sectoral forms of organization to national political life. Francoism, we would argue, did not achieve this result. Rather this regime strengthened the power of the Church, and left regional identities (which were also sometimes religious identities as in the case of Navarre) relatively untouched, or actually reinforced them.

What are the broader theoretical implications of this argument? We have distinguished three political positions. The Tocquevillian left praises civic associations because of their positive influence on political participation. The Tocquevillian right, in contrast, praises them for precisely the opposite reason. The Gramsci position synthesizes the Tocquevillian left's commitment to political participation with the Tocquevillian right's analysis of the consequences of civic autonomy for political participation. As we showed these positions have quite opposite implications for the relationship between authoritarianism and post-authoritarian political culture. The Tocquevillian left would expect a less participatory political culture in Italy with respect to Spain. The Tocquevillian right and Gramsci would expect the opposite pattern. On the analysis presented here the Tocquevillian right is clearly superior as an analytic argument. As we have shown the party organization was stronger and had a greater control over the associational sphere than in Spain. Yet there is little doubt that political participation was higher in post-authoritarian Italy than in Spain.

What does this mean for the broader issue of the connection between civil society and democracy? Our analysis may identify an inconsistency between analysis and prescription in the left Tocquevillian argument. To the extent the Tocquevillian left takes political

participation as a value, it should not prescribe civic autonomy as a means to achieve that political end. Mass party formation is likely to be a much more effective way of encouraging political participation. As our analysis shows mass party formation can have positive effects on political participation even if it occurs under the auspices of an authoritarian regime. Of course this discussion quickly leads to normative issues. For how one evaluates the issue of civic autonomy depends on what kind of democracy one likes best. If the ideal of democracy is the alternation of political parties, and a basic acceptance of the rules of the game, then Spain rather clearly appears to be the superior alternative. If, in contrast, one holds political participation to be a value in itself, then one may prefer the Italian model. This paper has sought only to understand how these two models were paradoxically linked to their two authoritarian experiences, and draw analytic lessons from these cases for the civil society debate. We leave the debate over democracy itself to the political philosophers.

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
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**Figure One Male Core Membership of the PNF**





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**Table 1. Voting turnout in the pre-authoritarian and post-authoritarian democratic periods**

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	Pre-authoritarian elections	Post-authoritarian elections
Italy	<b>58</b>	<b>90</b>
Spain	<b>69</b>	<b>74</b>

Note: We include as pre-authoritarian democratic elections those held under the principle of male universal suffrage. In Italy this corresponds to the elections between 1913 and 1922, and in Spain the elections between 1901 and 1936.

Sources: For Spain: Martínez Cuadrado (1969), Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros (1933, 1935), Tusell (1971), Ministerio del Interior (2004). For Italy: Istituto Centrale de Statistica (ISTAT) (1924, 1972, 2000), Ministero dell' Interno (2002).

**Table Two: Unconventional political participation in Italy and Spain. Percentage of people that were involved in those actions, 1981, 1991, 2001**

	1981		1991		2001	
	Italy	Spain	Italy	Spain	Italy	Spain
Signed a petition	42.1	23.9***	48.2	21.5***	54.6	27.4***
Attended a lawful demonstration	26.7	24.7	36.0	24.2***	34.8	26.4***
Joined a boycott	6.0	9.0**	10.9	5.9***	10.3	5.8***
Joined an unofficial strike	2.6	7.2***	6.1	6.7	5.4	8.2**
Occupied a building	5.8	3.1***	7.6	2.9***	8.0	2.7***

Note: \*\*\*: p-value<.001; \*\*: p-value<.01; \*:p-value<.05

Source: World Values Survey 1981, 1991, 2001